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NOTES

Bolivia and Coca: Law, Policy, and
Drug Control
ABSTRACr

Internationaldrug trafficking looms large in the future of
international relations.
Although drug production and
consumption can no longer be labeled as problems belonging
to a few discrete nations, some countries' identities in the
international arena are still shaped by their perception as
drug-producing nations. Bolivia is one such country. Coca
and cocaine have dominated its modem history and will
continue to dominate its future.
Bolivia's experience,
however, is representative of not only other Andean nations'
struggles with the drug epidemic, but of the international
community's struggle with drug trafficking.
This Note sheds light on the legal tools to address
international drug trafficking. Bolivia's history of coca
production, use, and legislation is used as the backdrop to
today's perplexing international drug situation. Also, this
Note analyzes internationalinvolvement in Bolivia, focusing
on U.N. responses to drug trafficking. The United States
currently dominates this hemisphere's action against cocaine
trafficking, inspiringsharp criticismfrom other nationsfor its
unilateral legal action. This Note concludes that only a
multilateralapproach,with increasedinvolvement by Andean
nations and the entire Latin American region, will solve the
current internationaldrug crisis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Centuries mark the history of the relationship between the
Bolivian people and coca, the principal ingredient of cocaine.
Ancient Indian traditions used the coca leaf in many facets of
cultural life, yet it never gained the notoriety of the modem
scourge of cocaine. United States-led international concern over
illicit narcotics trafficking has transformed Bolivian foreign

relations, economics, and internal politics, and it continues to
shape Bolivia's future and reflections about its past.
Bolivia is one of the Andean nations targeted by the U.S.
"War on Drugs,"' escalated by Presidents Reagan and Bush. 2 As

1.

In 1973, President Nixon declared an "all-out, global war on the drug

menace." Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibiton: An UnnaturalDisaster,27 CONN. L.
REV. 571, 574 (1995) (quoting President's Message to Congress Transmitting

Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973,
Administration, H.R. Doc. No. 69 (1973)).

Establishing a Drug

Enforcement
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cocaine became a problem for the United States, so too did it
become a problem for Bolivia. Since the 1980s, the United States
has remained heavily involved in fighting an international "war"
against drugs,3 especially against cocaine in the Andean nations
of Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. 4 Since the advent of the "war,"
however, drug supplies have increased substantially, both in the
United States and in the world market. The international drug
trade generates an estimated $400 to $500 billion annually.5
From 1984 to 1994, coca production nearly doubled, although the
United States spent billions of dollars on narcotics-control

assistance to Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.6 While the Bolivian7
government has cooperated with the U.S. anti-drug struggle,

2.

Presidents Reagan and Bush sought to combat the U.S. drug problem

through increasingly international means. Specifically, their administrations
attempted to stop drug smuggling nto the United States by strengthening
Interdiction efforts. Mathea Falco, Passing Grades: Branding Nations Won't
Resolve the U.S. Drug Problem,FOREIGN AFF., Sept. 19, 1995, at 15, 16 [hereinafter
Falco, PassingGrades]; see infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
Since 1981, the United States has spent $23 billion on international
3.
drug control. Mathea Falco, U.S. Drug Policy: Addicted to Failure,FOREIGN POLY,
Mar. 22, 1996, at 120, 124 [hereinafter Falco, U.S. Drug Policy].
4.
These countries are known as "source countries" in U.S. policy terms,
as they contribute the largest share of cocaine to the world and U.S. cocaine
consumers. Falco, Passing Grades, supra note 2, at 16-18. Bolivia, Peru, and
Colombia together produce 90% of the world's cocaine. Recent reports show that
other Latin American countries, such as Ecuador and Brazil, are also involved in
the illicit production and transport of coca and cocaine. Most cocaine production,
however, still takes place in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. Id. at 18-19. Although
the Clinton Administration attempted to shift funds from interdiction programs to
programs aimed at disrupting the production of drugs at their sources in
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, funding for interdiction and source country
programs decreased from $2.6 billion in 1992 to $1.6 billion in 1995. Id. at 17.
The source country strategy has been widely supported, however, and Congress
recently increased the programs' budgets. Richard J. Newman. Unwinnable War,
U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP., Nov. 4, 1996, at 40.
5.
The Washington-based Freedom House reported that the illicit drug
trade was a "global infestation by a force that has either overrun, outrun or
outflanked every U.S. and international attempt to control it." John Omiclinski,
Wealth of Booming Drug Trade Rivals that of Oil Industry, COURIER J., Nov. 4, 1996,
at 1A available in LEXIS, News Library, BUSDTL File. The report used estimates
from the U.N. and Interpol, and found that the illegal drug trade accounted for
between 10% and 13% of all international trade, greater than the international

trade in oil. Id.
Falco, U.S. Drug Policy, supra note 3, at 124. Drug prices in the U.S.
6.
have since dropped, discouraging policy efforts aimed at increasing prices to
discourage demand. Id. at 124-25. Cocaine prices have dropped by two-thirds
since 1981, and the administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Thomas
Constantine said that "drug availability and purity of cocaine and heroin are at an
all-time high." Id.
7.
Bolivia's cooperation is subject to various interpretations, however.
Many critics of the United States international drug control efforts note that
Bolivia's cooperation stems largely from economic aid that is vitally necessary for
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coca production has not diminished. Meanwhile, the problem of
U.S. cocaine consumption continues to demand a solution. 8
While some critics believe the international anti-drug effort is
at a standstill, legal mechanisms remain in place and new
projects continue. 9 Although the Clinton administration focuses
more resources than previous administrations on treatment
rather than enforcement, substantial U.S. funding of overseas
source country programs still supports the war against drugs in
Latin America.
The Andean nations of Peru, Bolivia, and
Colombia continue to lead the world in cocaine production,' 0
while the United States leads the world In cocaine consumption."l

its struggling economy. See Kevin Healy, The Role of Economic Development:
Policy Optionsfor IncreasePeasantParticipationin Peru and Bolivia, in DRUGS AND

FOREIGN POuICY 131 (Raphael F. Perl ed., 1994) (describing the role of economic
development in relation to international cocaine trafficking and drug policy in
Peru and Bolivia); see also Eduardo A. Gamarra, U.S.-Boliva Counternarcotics
Efforts During the Paz Zamora Administration: 1989-1992, in DRUG TRAFFICKING IN
THE AMEmCAS

217 (Bruce M. Bagley and William 0. Walker Ill eds., 1994) (arguing
that Bolivian counter-narcotics policy reflects external forces and pressures).
8.
The United States has an estimated eight million cocaine addicts, and
60% of global drug consumption occurs in the U.S. H.P. Klepak, The International
Drugs Trade: There's Roomfor All, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REv.-YEAR BOOK, Dec. 31,
1994, at 25, available in LEXIS, News Library, JANDEF File. American
consumption of cocaine has generally remained constant at about 300 tons per
year, or 300 million one-gram packets. Newman, supra note 4, at 40. But see
Falco, U.S. Drug Policy, supra note 3, at 126-27 (estimating that the United States
consumes a relatively small portion of the worldwide drug production, including
less than one-third of the total global cocaine production).
9.
On Nov. 6, 1996, the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies ratified a new
extradition treaty with the United States, which was signed in 1995. Bolivia Signs
ExtraditionTreaty with U.S. to DemonstrateCooperation n Drug War, NonISUR-LATIN

AM. POL. AFF., Nov. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, Market Library, IACNWS File
[hereinafter Bolivia Signs Extradition Treaty]. The treaty will allow extradition of

persons indicted in the country making the request, or persons who have been
convicted or sentenced for crimes covered in the agreement. Id. Through the
treaty, as well as other recent efforts, Bolivia has shown its willingness to
cooperate with the United States in its war against drugs. Id.

10.

See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Throughout the 1980s,

Colombia was the control center for cocaine production and trafficking and only a
minor producer of the coca leaf itself. Klepak, supra note 8. Colombia recently
replaced Bolivia, however, as the second largest producer of the crop behind
Peru. Id.
11.
Western Europe has increased its levels of cocaine consumption as
well. Consumption and trafficking of illicit drugs increased throughout the 1980s
in the United Kingdom. In 1985. the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee
expressed concerns over the levels of cocaine abuse in the United States: "Unless
immediate and effective action is taken, Britain and Europe stand to inherit the
American drug problem in less than 5 years. We see this as the most serious
peace time threat to our national well being." William C. Gilmore, International
Action Against Drug Trafficking: Trends n United Kingdom Law and Practice
Through the 1980's, 17 CoMMoNwEALTH L. BULL. 287, 289 (1991) (quoting House
of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Misuse of HardDrugs (InterimReport), H.C.
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The United States also leads the international community in
protesting the illicit production and trafficking of cocaine, and the
supply-side international strategy still garnishes support among
2
the U.S. public.'
Bolivia's situation is representative of all the Andean
countries' struggles with the cocaine trade. This Note uses Bolivia
as a model to evaluate the legal mechanisms available to address
the international drug trafficking problem. Part II traces the
history of coca production, use, and legislation in Bolivia to shed
light on part of the backdrop against which the international drug
effort must be viewed.
Part III explains the international
involvement in Bolivia, including the international drug problem
and the United Nations (hereinafter U.N.) response to it. Part IV
evaluates this hemisphere's action against cocaine trafficking,
focusing on U.S. involvement, bilateral treaties, and regional
agreements. Part V suggests possible alternatives in law and
policy for addressing the coca issue in Bolivia. The current
international approach to cocaine trafficking is failing. This Note
concludes that only a multilateral approach, with the greatest
involvement by the Andean nations, will approach the necessary
regional solution to the drug crisis.

II. COCA INBOLIVIA
To understand the complex framework of Bolivia's coca
production and subsequent international concerns over it, coca
itself must be considered as one factor among many. Bolivia's
cultural, political, and economic traditions have allowed the coca
industry to amass a strength rivaled only by international
demand for coca and cocaine.
Today, regulation of coca
production permeates Bolivia's international relations.

399, 1984-85, para. 2). In 1989, the Home Office said that "the perceived threat

from cocaine has materialised." Id. Since 1992, the European Community has
begun to coordinate its police and military activities against the illicit drug trade.
Kiepak, supra note 8. The European Union recently announced that nations that
consume narcotic drugs need to help stop their production by encouraging

alternative crops. The European Union embarked on such a mission by signing a
30 million European currency units (Ecus) project with Bolivia, the first 19 million

of which will go toward alternative crop development. EU to Give Bolivia 30 MIn
Ecu to Fight Drugs, Reuters N. Am. Wire, Apr. 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, TXTNWS File.
12.
The supply-side strategy focuses on decreasing the supply of drugs
overseas in an attempt to lower the amount of illegal drugs entering the United
States. See tnfra notes 163-87 and accompanying text.
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A. Does Bolivia Have a CocaineProblem?
This question can be answered both in the affirmative and
the negative. Many Bolivians would respond that Bolivia has the
problem of pressure imposed by the United States to curb coca
production because of the U.S. cocaine epidemic. Domestically,
however, cocaine abuse does not appear to pose a serious
problem for the Bolivian population.' 3 Yet, narco-trafflcking
activities threaten Bolivia's political and economic stability.
Bolivia is the poorest country in South America, and, among
Latin American countries, its poverty level is second only to that
of Haiti. 14 With a per capita income of $770 a year, many
Bolivian farmers have discovered a profitable industry in coca
production, which yields about $475 an acre annually.' 5 In
contrast, crops such as bananas and grapefruit average from $35
to $250 a year, if buyers exist.' 6 Although coca has been
cultivated for centuries, the illicit coca phenomenon in Bolivia has
existed, arguably, for only the last couple of decades.
B. The Evolution of Coca in Bolivia
Coca has been used in Bolivia for centuries, but not in the
concentrated form of powder or rock cocaine that has given the
coca leaf international notoriety in the last twenty years. Rather,
ancient rituals and traditions involved chewing the coca leaf
(acullico})7 or drinking it in the form of tea (mate de coca). The
Inca kings and nobility chewed coca leaves and the practice

13.
Cocaine use in Bolivia is not even the subject of the majority of drug
control policy options, although Bolivia appears to have suffered increased
cocaine-dependence between 1976 and 1987. In 1976, cocaine dependency
cases represented about 10% of all medical cases involving drug use; by 1987,
the proportion had increased to 33%. Maria Elena Medina-Mora & Maria del
Carmen Mariflo, DrugAbuse in Latin America, in DRUG PoucY IN THE AMERIcAS 45,
50 (Peter H. Smith ed. 1992) (citing M. M. de la Quintar, Informe sobre el consumo
de sustancias psicoactivas en La Paz, Bolivia, SALUD PuBucA (1988)). But see
Falco, U.S. Drug Policy, supra note 3, at 126-27 (stating that the U.S. cocaine
market absorbs less than one-third of total global production).
14.
Bolivia'sDebt; FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1997, at 13, available in LEXIS, News
Library, FINTME File.
15.
Falco, U.S. Drug Policy, supranote 3, at 126.
16.
Id. Even when coca prices are depressed, many farmers still find It
easier to market coca leaves than bananas or pineapples. David LaGesse, U.S.,
Bolivia Cite Progressin Stopping CocaFarmers;But Many Grow It Despite Anti-Drug
Ai, Military Raids, DALiAS MORNIG NEws, July 25, 1996, at IA, available n 1996
WL 10967387 [hereinafter LaGesse].
17.
CoCA AND CocAinE: AN ANDEAN PERSPEnvE 1-2, 6 (Felipe E. Mac
Gregor ed., Jonathan Cavanagh & Rosemary Underhay trans., 1993) [hereinafter
Mac Gregor].
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became widespread, especially among highland Bolivians and
Peruvians. 1 8 Coca remained a valuable commodity throughout
the Spanish invasion in the sixteenth century.' 9 During colonial
20
times, coca was used to pay slaves in the tin and silver mines.
Many traditions involving the coca leaf continue among the
indigenous Bolivian populations, which consist mainly of Aymara
and Quechua Indians. 2 1 Coca remains an integral part of Andean
Bolivian culture. The leaf is used for medicinal purposes, 2 2 as an
appetite and thirst suppressant, 23 to counter the effects of
altitude sickness, 24 and often as the central focus of religious and
cultural rituals. 25 In most rural areas of Bolivia, workers carry

18.
RENSSELAER W. LEE III, TmE WHrIE LABYRINTH: CocAINE AND POLMcAL
POWER 24 (1989).
19.
The Spanish conquistador Francisco Pizarro destroyed the Inca Empire
in 1535. Prior to this, the Incas had built the largest indigenous empire in the
Americas.
The Inca Empire included modem day Chile, Peru, Bolivia, and
Ecuador. MARK A. BURKHOLDER & LYMAN L. JOHNSON, COLONIAL LATIN AMERICA 1114 (1990). Previously, the Incas had overtaken the Aymara Indians, whose
culture flourished between the seventh and tenth centuries. Id. at 312. Bolivia
gained its independence from Spain in 1825 and took its name from famous
leader Sim6n Bolivar. Id.
20.
Mac Gregor, supra note 17, at 1-2.
21.
Bolivia today is 55% indigenous (30% Quechua, 25% Aymara), 2530% mestizo, or mixed Indian and Spanish descent, and 5-15% European.
WORLD FACTS AND MAPS 85 (Rand McNally ed., 1996). Although the official
language is Spanish, most of the indigenous populations also speak either
Aymara or Quechua. Id.
22.
The leaves of coca are used in ointments, bathing solutions, and
massages, and are believed to cure various illnesses. HARRY SANABRIA. THm COCA
BOOM AND RURAL SociAL CHANGE IN BOLIVIA 38 (1993).
23.
With over 65% of the nation in poverty, malnutrition and hunger are
serious problems in Bolivia. Mac Gregor, supra note 17, at 2. The stimulant
found within the coca leaf acts to suppress that hunger. Id. Although once
believed to contribute to the persistence of malnutrition, coca does not harm the
nutrition of its users, according to recent studies. Id.
24.
Most of the indigenous Bolivians live on the Atp/ano (high Andes), In
the high and dry areas of the Andes Mountains.
Many inhabitants of the
Altiplano area live as much as fourteen thousand feet above sea level. Side
effects of such high altitudes include shortness of breath, dizziness, nausea, and
headaches because of low oxygen levels. Coca acts as a stimulant and increases
energy levels, while suppressing the effects of the altitude. SANABRIA, supra note
22, at 38.
25.
Many rituals, descended from ancient peoples such as the Incas, use
coca leaves in common pipes smoked during prayers and ceremonies. The leaf is
often chewed throughout such religious ceremonies and Is believed to hold higher
powers. Many marriage rituals also require gifts of coca: "The offering and use of
coca also cements other social obligations, functions as an index of cultural
identity, and serves as a medium of communication between humans and
supernatural beings." Id.
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little pouches (k'intus) of coca leaves in their pockets. 2 6 Chewing
coca is considered an important social skill; adults gather to chew
it after meals and pause for coca breaks. 2 7 Coca serves an
economic role even without the cocaine industry, functioning as a
medium of exchange and as a deferred payment in many parts of
28
the Andes.
Throughout the 1970s, however, the cultivation of coca
shifted from mostly traditional subsistence farming to massive
export-oriented coca production.
This shift was not a
spontaneous change in agricultural practices on the part of
Bolivian coca farmers (cocaleros); rather, it resulted from a
combination of political, economic, and social factors. Politically,
Bolivia is one of only four nations in Latin America to have
sustained a popularly based revolution.2 9 In 1952, the political
group known as the Moviniento Nacionalista Revolucionario
(National Revolutionary Movement) gained power after an urban
revolt.3 0 The new government made significant changes that
affected the country in many ways. The government nationalized
about eighty percent of Bolivia's main industry, tin. It also
implemented comprehensive agrarian reform. Broad agrarian
reform efforts divided the old hacienda system and distributed
land to Indian farmers.3 1 As the old land structure collapsed, the
32
working and peasant classes became politically mobilized.
Increased political power and massive income redistribution
allowed these classes to participate more in Bolivia's political life
33
and exert more pressure on the government.

26.
See CLARE HARGREAVES, SNOWFIELDS: THE WAR ON COCAINE INTHE ANDES
43 (1992). The middle classes of Bolivia's cities often view coca chewing as a dirty
habit, but drink it in the form of tea (matd de coca). Id.
27.
Id. See also CATHERINE J. ALLEN, THE HOLD LIFE HAS: COCA AND
CULTURAL IDENTIY IN AN ANDEAN COMMUNITY (1988) (describing the ritual practices
that revolve around the coca leaf in a Peruvian community of Quechua-speaking
peasants).
28.
See SANABRiA, supra note 22, at 38. Laborers in the agricultural and
mining industries often utilize coca leaves both for consumption and exchange.

Id.
29.
The other nations that sustained revolutions were Mexico (1910-1920),
Cuba (1959), and Nicaragua (1979).
30.
See James M. Malloy, BolivLa An Incomplete Revolution, in LArIN
AMERICAN PoLITIcs AND DEVELOPMENT 362 (Howard J. Wiarda & Harvey F. Kline
eds., 2d ed. 1985).

31.
Id.
32.
Between 1952 and 1956, Bolivia moved in a socialist direction because
labor was very powerful. Id. at 372.
33.
Agrarian reform remains an important issue in Bolivia. In August
1996, several indigenous organizations marched 900 kilometers from Santa Cruz
de la Sierra to the capital of La Paz to protest an agrarian reform bill. Bolivia.
Social Problems Plague President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada's Government,
NOnSUR-LATIN AM. POL. AFF., Aug. 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8089432

19971
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Although the central government increased its formal powers
after the 1952 revolution, the state remains weak against internal
pressures. 3 4 Bolivia's weak central government can be traced
historically to the Spanish colonial system and, more recently, to
constant threats to its external and internal sovereignty.3 5 While
the Bolivian constitutional structures reflect the Spanish
tradition, in which most political power resides in the chief
executive and the administrative tools of the state, these branches
have not been very powerful in Bolivia. The 1952 revolution
36
furthered the lack of central political authority in Bolivia.

The weakness of Bolivia's central government can be
explained by various factors. Relative to its size, Bolivia's overall
population is small, mostly rural, and fragmented along racial,
ethnic, and cultural lines. Also, Bolivia's dramatic topography
divides it into three distinct regions, enhancing geographic and
regional diversity, as well as inter-regional rivalry. 3 7 The lack of
strong state institutions, coupled with regional diversity and
autonomy in parts of Bolivia, arguably set the stage for later drug
38
production to prosper.
Economic factors also contributed to the rise in exportoriented coca production in Bolivia. Since the Spanish colonial
era, Bolivia's economy has been based on the export of minerals

[hereinafter Soca Problems]. The bill the government sent to Congress did not
include the proposed changes resulting from recent negotiations between the
government and campesino and indigenous groups. See id.
34.
See Malloy, supranote 30, at 372.
35.
Because Bolivia shares its borders with five other nations (Peru, Chile,
Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil), its external sovereignty has been threatened by
various border disputes, all of which Bolivia has lost. Id. at 364. In the War of
the Pacific, 1879-1882 (Bolivia and Peru versus Chile), Bolivia lost its seacoast
and became landlocked. Id. In its defeat in the Chaco War with Paraguay, 19321935, Bolivia set its own stage for the 1952 Revolution and the future
involvement of the military. Id. Bolivia's internal sovereignty has been threatened

by a weak central state and powerful regional factions. Id.
36.

See ScoTT B. MACDONALD, MOUNTAiN HIGH, WHn'E AVALANCHE:

COCAINE

AND POWER IN THE ANDEAN STATES AND PANAMA 68 (1989). The MNR lost power to
the military in 1964, and the military controlled Bolivian political life until 1982.
Malloy, supra note 30, at 374-76. Some 70 political parties appeared, adding to
the already large number of factions dividing central authority in Bolivia. Id. at
374.
37.
The three topographical regions of Bolivia are the altipkno (high plain),
the yungas (semitropical valleys), and the Uaros (lowlands). The geographical
diversity has added to the strong regional identity that many Bolivians feel. Thus,
the central government is often not the national focus of Bolivian identity. Malloy,
supranote 30, at 365.
38.

See JAIME MALAmuD-GOTI, SMOKE AND MIRRORs:

DRUG WARs 5 (1992); MACDONALD, supranote 36, at 68-9.

THE PARADOX O THE

826

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 30:817

to foreign countries. 3 9 The decrease in international market
prices for tin and natural gas in the 1970s and 1980s led to the
decline of the highland economy and to high rates of

unemployment.

Many workers migrated from the highlands to

40
the Chapare, where coca cultivation offered jobs and profits.

During the 1980s, the illegal coca economy surpassed the

traditional legal coca 4 market,
launching Bolivia into the
1
international drug trade.
Three areas of Bolivia yield most of its coca:

the Yungas in

La Paz, the Chapare in Cochabamba, and the Yapacani in Santa
Cruz. 4 2 Ideal coca-growing climates and extreme poverty in these
rural areas make them prime regions for coca production.
Continuing rural poverty, combined with a lack of economic
opportunities in the cities, perpetuates coca production among
rural farmers. 43 About forty-two percent of Bolivia's seven million
people live in rural areas, and of these, an estimated eighty
percent suffer extreme poverty, according to the U.N.
44
Development Program.

39.
Silver was the main export until the mid-nineteenth century. Malloy,
supra note 30, at 365. Since the 1880s, tin has been the predominant export,
although oil and natural gas have become important in the last 20 years. Id.
40.
See MALAmu-Gon. supra note 38, at 10. The Chapar& became an
attractive location for unemployed tin miners from Postosf and Oruro and
peasants from Cochabamba. Id. The cotton market also collapsed in 1975 and
1976, which led many rich cotton producers from Santa Cruz into the more
profitable coca/cocaine enterprise. Id.
41.
Bolivia's rise to notoriety was sparked by the "cocaine coup" of July 17,
1980, that brought the narco military command of General Garcia Meza.
MACDONALD, supranote 36, at 72. Garcia Meza's military dictatorship ruled until
1981, when a coup ousted the regime from power and Bolivia returned to a
democratic form of government. Id. at 75-6.
42.
Mac Gregor, supra note 17, at 3. In 1988, the estimated total area
planted with coca in Bolivia was 60,956 hectares, with 51,198 In Cochabamba;
8,913 in La Paz; and 845 in Santa Cruz. Id. The Yungas is In the department of
La Paz on the eastern slopes of the Andes. The Chapare Is a large area in the
department of Cochabamba, formed by parts of the provinces of Chapare,
Carrasco, and Arani. I&. at 3-4. In 1985, the Chapare was the main coca-growing
region of Bolivia, producing between 90% to 95% of Bolivia's coca. SANABRiA,
supranote 22, at 41.
43.
See Pat Hynds, Latin America: Growing Consensus that U.S. Anti-Drug
Policy is Not Working, NOTnSuR-LAnN AM. POL. AFF., Feb. 9, 1996, availablein 1996
WL 8089348. Many campesinos now growing coca in the Chapare worked as
miners in the government-owned tin and silver mines until 10 years ago. Id. In
1985, the world price of tin plummeted and many miners could not find work.
Many former miners then migrated to the Chapare and began growing coca. Id.
Although very wealthy people also grow coca, the risks inherent in illicit coca
production have been increasingly shifted from the wealthy to the campesinos.
The majority of profits are not earned in the production phase, but in the later
trafficling stage. LaGesse, supra note 16.
44.
See SocialProblems, supranote 33.
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Primarily in response to U.S. pressures, Bolivian police have
45
recently escalated enforcement against illegal coca cultivation.
But the willingness of Bolivia's government to cooperate with the
United States by punishing the coca growers has resulted in
violent confrontations in the Chapare. 4 6 Many coca growers not
only claim the right to grow coca because the plant was sacred to
their ancestors, but also claim the right to grow coca to earn a
living. 4 7 Coca growers have formed a large organized political
force and frequently protest government efforts to eradicate or
reduce coca cultivation. 4 8 Bolivia allows legal coca production

outside the Chapare, demonstrating the government's recognition
and acceptance of traditional licit uses of coca.

Most coca is

grown in the Chapare, however, where the government has
49
declared most coca plants illegal.

C. Regulationof Coca in Bolivia
Bolivia's government has found international cooperation
with drug enforcement efforts a political and economic necessity.
Politically, Bolivia needs to maintain international favor,

especially with the United States. As a landlocked country and a
relatively new and fragile democracy,5 0 Bolivia cannot afford to
45.

See infra Part IV.

46.

LaGesse, supra note 16. Human rights groups have focused attention

on the Bolivian government's use of force in the eradication of coca. Between
April and May of 1997, three coca growers and two police officers were killed in
clashes over eradication of drug crops in the Chapare region. Four Killed in
Bolivian Drug Clash, UPI, Apr. 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI
File; One Killed, 14 Irjured in Clash Over Coca Fields, RECORD, May 9, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 6886983. The government blames criminal drug trafficking
groups, while the coca growers blame police for what they considered "a
massacre." Four Killed in Bolivian Drug Clash, supra; One Killed, 14 Injured in
Clash Over Coca Fields, supra. In 1995, four civilians were fatally shot and at
least a dozen were injured by gunfire during confrontations between cocaleros and
police. According to Human Rights Watch/Americas, "The farmers fought to
protect their livelihood. The heavy hand of U.S. drug enforcement has fallen on
the peasant farmers of the Chapare." LaGesse, supra note 16.
47.
LaGesse, supra note 16. Numerous protests by campeslnos defending
their right to grow coca leaf have occurred in La Paz. Hynds, supranote 43.
48.
See Social Problems, supra note 33. Coca growers have voiced their
opposition to government eradication efforts, which have led to human rights
violations by anti-drug personnel, especially in the Chapare coca-growing region.
Id. "The government is trying to take away the coca growers' lands, because they
consider planting coca a subversive act against the state . . . [and we must
protest] to prevent more human rights violations, stop the forced eradication of
coca fields, and stop our land from being taken," said Evo Morales, leader of the
organized coca growers. Id.
49.
LaGesse, supra note 16; see infra note 76 and accompanying text.
50.
After a series of military dictatorships, Bolivia regained a democratic
form of government in 1981. MAcDoNALD, supranote 36, at 75-6.
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lose international esteem, already diminished since the advent of
cocaine trafficking concerns.
Furthermore, the economic
situation in Bolivia is bleak. Still recovering from the debt crisis
of the 1980s and dependent on foreign aid for agricultural
development and other economic revitalization programs, Bolivia
has passed anti-drug laws to satisfy international demands.
1. The 1961 U.N. Single Convention: Coca's Demise
The 1961 U.N. Convention on Narcotics 5 ' developed a set of
norms and provisions to limit narcotic use to medical and
scientific purposes. The Convention said that "addiction to
narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is
fraught with social and economic danger to mankind."5 2 The list
of substances subject to control included both cocaine and the
coca leaf. The traditional practice of chewing coca leaves was
defined as an "undue use of drugs."5 3 The Convention defined
illicit traffic as "cultivation or trafficking in drugs, contrary to the
provisions of this Convention" 5 4 and production as "the
separation of opium, coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin

from the plants from which they are obtained."55

Thus,

cultivating coca was itself deemed to be illicit trafficking, and the
harvesting of coca was defined as illegal narcotics production.
The Convention stated that "coca leaf chewing must be
abolished within twenty-five years from the coming into force of
this Convention."5 6 The Convention left individual countries to
enforce the norms, but suggested eradication. 5 7 After ratifying
the Convention, Bolivia passed a narcotics law in 1962, which did
not include coca leaves as a narcotic, perhaps signifying
resistance to international concern over coca. Later that year,
however, a government decree ordered a census of coca
plantations and prohibited new plantations.5 8 In conformity with
51.
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407,
520 U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1964) [hereinafter 1961 Single

Convention].

The 1961 Single Convention was ratified by the Bolivian

government.

52.

I& at 1409, 520 U.N.T.S. at 204.

53.

Mac Gregor, supra note 17, at 16.

54.
1961 Single Convention, supra note 51, 18 U.S.T. at 1410, 520
U.N.T.S. at 206.
55.
Id. at 1410, 520 U.N.T.S. at 208.
56.
Id. at 1429, 520 U.N.T.S. at 264.
57.
"The parties shall so far as possible enforce the uprooting of all coca
bushes which grow wild. They shall destroy the coca bushes if illegally
cultivated." Id. at 1421, 520 U.N.T.S. at 238.
58.
Mac Gregor, supranote 17, at 16-17. The Ministry of Agriculture also
started a crop substitution program. Coca leaves were still not deemed a narcotic
in Bolivia, however. Id. at 17.
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the 1961 Convention, the Inter-Ministerial Narcotics Commission
began a research project in 1966 to fight cocaine trafficking and
to reduce and gradually eradicate coca plantations by replacing
coca with other crops.5 9 The research project also sought to
reduce coca leaf chewing and to fight drug addiction within

Bolivia, issues that have received less attention than coca

60
production in recent years.
Bolivia created the National Office for the Control of
Dangerous Substances (hereinafter DNCSP) in 1973, following the
norms of the 1961 Convention. 6 1 The United States also began to
support Bolivian coca control in the 1970s. In 1974, as its own
demand for cocaine began to increase, the United States financed
an $8 million pilot project to determine the feasibility of a longterm plan to reduce coca production in Bolivia. 6 2 In 1977, 1978,
and 1979, the United States and Bolivia signed several bilateral
agreements in which the United States gave financial assistance
for the DNCSP to combat cocaine production and trafficking. 6 3 In
1979, the Bolivian government passed a new law that failed to list
coca leaves as illegal narcotic, but did prohibit new coca
plantations and the expansion of registered ones. 64
Thus,
although Bolivia complied with some provisions of international
law, it resisted enacting anti-coca laws domestically.
On November 15, 1981, the Bolivian government enacted a
law to Control and Fight Dangerous Substances, which allowed
the Chapare-Yungas Development Project (hereinafter PRODES)
to offer legal coca producers long-term credits and technical
support to substitute other crops of similar profitability. 6 5 The

59.
60.

Id.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Mac Gregor, supra

note 17, at 17.
61.
Law No. 11245 created the DNCSP and established registration of coca
growers and the "gradual, systematic, and planned reduction of coca leaf
cultivation in the country, by substituting it with other crops as profitable or more
so." Mac Gregor, supra note 17, at 17.
62.
63.

Id.
The financial contribution of the United States included $11 million for

agricultural development projects in the Yungas and the Chapare. Id. This then
spawned the creation of the Chapare-Yungas Development Project (hereinafter
PRODES), an inter-ministerial agency for crop substitution, with technical and

financial support from the United States Agency for International Development
(hereinafter USAID). I. The PRODES legislation was revised in 1976, and
established a Plan for Integrated Development, which restricted coca cultivation

to legal demand levels. Id.
64.
Law No. 16562 was passed on June 13, 1979, under the government
of General Padila Arancibia. Id. Registration is the national system in Bolivia for
licensing legal coca crops. Id.

65.

Law No. 18714 provided that the National Anti-Drug Traffic Council,

through the DNCSP, would buy and sell the coca leaves, seeking a certain profit
margin to balance supply and demand for traditional chewing, medical, and
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law also established a state monopoly on the buying and selling of
coca leaves and prohibited all coca plantations outside the
departments of La Paz and Cochabamba. 6 6 The law did not

reduce coca production, however. The state-controlled markets
gathered only a small amount of legal coca and encouraged
corruption and abuse, while offering lower prices to producers
than the illicit traffickers' rates. 67
In 1985, the Bolivian
legislature passed new Regulations for the Control of Dangerous
Substances. The new regulations recognized all drugs
listed in
68
the 1961 Convention, including coca plants and leaves.
2. Ley 1008: The Law of Foreigners
The most prominent Bolivian anti-drug law, the Coca and
Controlled Substances Law, Ley 1008,69 was enacted by the
Bolivian legislature on July 19, 1988. Ley 1008 was written with
the assistance of the United States Agency for International
Development (hereinafter USAID). The United States sought to
ensure that narco-trafficking would be defined as a crime in
Bolivia and that the growth of coca leaf cultivation would be
stopped. 70 Although Ley 1008 was enacted largely in response to
U.S. pressure to prohibit the production and marketing of coca,
the law also formally recognizes the licit uses of the coca leaf.
Significantly, Ley 1008 first states that coca is a natural
product from the subtropical departments of La Paz and
Cochabamba, with ancient origins that derive from pre-Colombian
Bolivian history. 7 1 The law also allows for the cultivation of the
coca leaf for agricultural and cultural use, as well as for the
traditional use of coca for medicine aid rituals in Andean

communities. 72

Ley 1008 explicitly differentiates between the

natural state of coca, which produces no known negative health
effects, and coca that has been chemically transformed into the
cocaine alkaloid, which has dangerous psycho-physical and

pharmaceutical purposes. Coca producers had to sell their leaves at collection
sub-centers, and transporting coca, except through the proper authorities, was
banned. Id at 17-18.
66.
Id. at 18.
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
Ley del Regimen de la Coca y Sustanclas Controladas: Ley 1008
(1988) [hereinafter Ley 1008]; see COCA-CRONOLOGiA, BoLVA: 1986-1992, at
114 (Maria Lohman ed. 1992) [hereinafter COCA-CRONOL6GIA]; see generally ABA,
Commentary on the Ley Del Regimen de la Coca y Sustanclas Controladas,6 INmRAM. LEGAL MATERALs 278 (1995).
70.
See ABA, supranote 69, at 280.
71.

See Ley 1008, art. 1.

72.

Id. art. 2.
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biological health consequences and is used in the criminal drug
73
trade.
Under Ley 1008, licit consumption of the coca leaf includes
traditional social and cultural practices of the Bolivian
population, such as the acuf!ico (coca-chewing) and medicinal and
ritualistic uses.74 The production of the coca leaf to meet the
legal demand is defined as necessary production, and subsistence
farmers who cultivate coca for personal use are defined as legal
producers. 75 Production surpassing the necessary amount is
defined as excess production. 76 Conceding to U.S. demands, the
law also requires the gradual eradication of coca through
voluntary and forced removal of plants. While the law aims at
annual targets of eradication of coca hectares, it requires
international development assistance to realize these goals. 7 7 The
law therefore recognizes the need for foreign aid not only to
implement this law, but also to combat the economic conditions
perpetuating the coca and cocaine trade in Bolivia.
In an attempt to tame the domestic tensions arising from
domestic and international attacks on coca leaf cultivation, the
anti-drug law includes a key concept of the agreement signed

73.

Id. art. 3.

74.
Id. art. 4. Other forms of licit use of the coca leaf that do not harm the
body or lead to addiction/dependency will be the object of special regulation. Id.
art. 5.
75.
Id. art. 12.
76.
I& art 6. Article 8 establishes three zones of production of coca in
Bolivia: the zone of traditional production; the zone of excess production; and the
zone of illicit production. The zone of traditional production encompasses the
uses outlined in Article 4, supra note 74, and also restricts the areas in which
coca may be cultivated for such purposes. Small coca-producing lands are
permitted in the subtropical regions of North and South Yungas, Murillo,
Muftecas, Franz Tamayo and Inquisivi of the Department of La Paz, and the
Yungas of Vandiola, which includes part of the provinces of Tiraque and Carrasco
of the Department of Cochabamba. Id. art. 9. The zone of excess production In
transition is where the cultivation of coca is the result of spontaneous or directed
colonization, which has sustained the expansion of excess cultivation throughout
the increase in demand for illicit uses. Id. art. 10. This zone remains subject to
annual plans for reduction, substitution, and development, starting with the
Integral Program of Development and Substitution, which calls for 5,000 hectares
a year to be reduced, until the goal of 8,000 hectares a year is reached. Id. This
zone includes the provinces of Saavedra, Larecaja, and Loayza, the areas of
colonization of Yungas in the Department of La Paz, and the provinces of the
Chapare, Carrasco, Tiraque. and Arani of the Department of Cochabamba. Id.
The zone of illicit production comprises those areas where the cultivation of coca
is prohibited, including all territory in Bolivia except the zones defined in Articles
9 and 10 of Ley 1008. Plantations there are subject to mandatory eradication
without any compensation. Id. art. 11.
77.
ABA, supra note 69, at 278; Ley 1008, arts. 8-14.
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between the government and the coca growers in June 1987.78
Ley 1008 states that all coca crop substitution will be
accomplished gradually. Crop substitution will be implemented
in conjunction with socio-economic development programs in the
traditional and surplus-in-transition zones. 7 9 The law defines as
illicit all uses of the coca leaf destined for the chemical production
of cocaine.8 0
Ley 1008 establishes a new system outside the normal
criminal process for prosecuting traffickers, producers, and users
of drugs, 8 1 as well as a licensing process for legal coca
marketing. 8 2 Ley 1008 creates a separate system of justice that
has sole jurisdiction over narcotics offenses. 8 3 As one of its
primary objectives, the legislation seeks to hasten the prosecution
of narcotics offenses. The length of investigations by the police
and prosecutors, as well as the lengths of trials, closing argument
periods, and sentencing proceedings, were all reduced.8 4 Under
Ley 1008, accused drug offenders remain in jail during the entire
judicial process. 85 Automatic pre-trial incarceration, coupled with
mandatory sentencing provisions, 86 allows prosecutors and
judges almost no discretion in the prosecution of drug offenders.
Thus, the enforcement mechanisms of Ley 1008 have been
criticized as severe.

78.
Acuerdo Sobre el Plan Integral de Desarrollo y Sustitucon (PIDYS), in
COCA-CRONOLOGfA, supra note 69, at 29 (agreement signed on June 6, 1987
between the Government and the Bolivian Labor Union (CentralObreraBolivfona),
the Confederation of Rural Workers Union (Confederacldn Sindical (Intca de
Trabojadores Campesinos de Boivfa), and the Federations of Coca Producers
(Federacionesde Productoresde Coca)).
79.
See Ley 1008, art. 22; Mac Gregor, supranote 17, at 19.
80.
See Ley 1008, art. 7.
81.
See ABA, supranote 69, at 278; see alsoLey 1008, tits. III, IV, V.
82.
See ABA, supra note 69, at 278; see also Ley 1008, tit. I ch. H1,tit. II,
ch. I.
83.
The system is made up of the Controlled Substance Courts (Juzgados

de Sustancias Controladas) and the Controlled Substance Judges (Juezes de
Sustancias Controladas). See Ley 1008, arts. 83-90; ABA, supra note 69, at 281.
84.
The instructional stage of trial (etapade tnstrucci6n), during which the
prosecutor and the defense attorney present additional proof before the court,
was also eliminated. This stage was deemed unnecessary because most arrests
are tnflagrante de/icto (in the act). See ABA, supra note 69, at 281-82. If the
procedures of Ley 1008 are strictly followed, a case should last 111 days from
arrest to Supreme Court sentencing. A typical case lasts three to four years
before a final sentence. See td. at 282. For an overview of the criminal
proceedings, see d. at 282-86.
85.
See d. at 287.
86.

See Ley 1008, art. 48.
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Some
commentators
believe
Ley
1008
contains
unconstitutional provisions on its face8 7 and contributes to
possible human rights violations as applied.8 8 Bolivia's prisons
are filled with drug offenders, the majority of whom are very

poor.8 9

Human rights activists assert that the underclass is

being discriminated against through the application of Ley 1008
because the poor are disproportionately represented in the

prisons. 90

Suggested reforms for Ley 1008 include keeping the

cocaleros and pisa-coca91 out of prisons. Because farmers who
cultivate coca and other low-level drug participants are easily

replaced with other growers and are often manipulated by higher

drug organizations, their incarceration is unlikely to reduce the
illicit production of coca.
Nearly a decade since its enactment, Ley 1008 still inspires
fierce debate in Bolivia. Even the government's position on the

law has wavered and remains ill-defined. During the first fifteen
months of President Gonzalez Sanchez de Lozada's term in office,
which began in July 1993, government officials proposed twenty

different positions on coca control.9 2 These included continued
eradication of "excess" coca leaf, voluntary eradication, alternative
crop development, and "opci6n 0," or total eradication of all coca

in the main growing region within six years.9 3

The Bolivian

87.
The law presumes the guilt of the accused, whereas the Bolivian
Constitution, the Penal Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedure require the
presumption of innocence. See ABA, supra note 69, at 288 (citing Constituct6n
Politico del Estato de Bolivia, art. 16 (1972); Cddigo de ProcedimientoPenal,Decreto
Ley No. 104.226, art. 3 (1972); and C6digo Penal,Decreto Ley No. 10426, art. 70
(1972)). Ley 1008 mandates incarceration of prisoners until the Supreme Court
makes a ruling; this includes those acquitted by a lower court. See id.
88.
See id. at 279. Recent reports state that Bolivian police have increased
enforcement against illegal coca in reaction to U.S. pressure, which has led to
violent confrontations between police and the coca growers. LaGesse, supra note
16.
89.
See ABA, supra note 69, at 287. While the intent of the law was to
punish narco-traffickers who exploit the poor and bring crime and violence to
Bolivia, the poor ultimately feel the harshness of the law. See Ad.at 288.
90.
With the rights of incarcerated, accused drug offenders also curtailed
by Ley 1008, and unsanitary, and overcrowded conditions of most prisons,
human rights activists find legitimate grounds on tvo fronts to criticize the law.
See id. at 289. Recently, however, Bolivia's Minister of Justice, Rene Blattman,
told the U.N. Commission on Human Rights that Bolivia had made progress
toward human rights reforms and had passed much legislation to reform the
judicial system, including modified anti-drug laws. See Bolivian Justice Minister
Tells Human Rights Commission of Reform in Country's Judicial System, M2

Pressilre, Apr. 2, 1997, availablein LEXIS, Market Library, IACNWS File.
91.
This term refers to the peasants hired to perform manual labor in the
coca maceration pits. See ABA, supranote 69, at 290 n.36.
92.
See id. at 279.
93.
See id.
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government even proposed the international legalization of coca
leaf cultivation as part of an agreement between the government
and the coca producers. The international community, however,
94
rejected Bolivia's proposal.
From the U.S. perspective, Ley 1008 Is a clear and necessary
law that, if fully implemented, could alleviate some of the cocaine
problems the United States faces. 95 Many aspects of the law have
not been implemented fully, however, because the cocaleros have
placed political pressure on the Bolivian government. 96 Coca
plantations have continued to expand, while the coca leaf trade
has remained outside the legal markets and few cocaine
traffickers have gone to jail.9 7 Ley 1008 is not enforced because
there is no national consensus with respect to coca cultivation.

Although Bolivians do not support the criminal aspects of narcotrafficking, cocaleros represent Bolivian culture and tradition in
resisting U.S. power and influence.
Further, the financial
rewards of coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking are
substantial.
Recently, talks between the government and cocaleros have
sparked renewed resentment among Bolivians against the antidrug law.
Many Bolivians maintain that Ley 1008, as a
concession to international requirements, represents a threat to
national sovereignty and to the cultural and historical traditions
associated with the coca leaf.9 8 Moreover, many Bolivians believe
that all U.S. assistance hinges on Bolivia's cooperation in the U.S.
war against drugs. U.S. certification requirements support this
belief. 9 9 As the United States urged the promulgation of Ley 1008
and provides support 0 0 conditioned on eradication efforts,

94.
A U.N. Development Program spokesman said that the general opinion
of the U.N. was "against decriminalization of coca on a world level." Bolivia Coca
ProposalRejected, UPI, Sept. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
95.
See ABA, supranote 69, at 291.

96.
The coca farmer union, with a membership of 35,000, is the largest
union in Bolivia. In September 1994, members participated in a two-week march
from the jungle to the capital of La Paz. During their march, they gained much
support from the city population, which then pressured the government to sign

an Accord with the union. This Accord recognized the rights of the coca workers
and the legitimacy of their requests, and stated that the government would
consider further decriminalization of coca. See (d. at 291 n.37.
97.

Mac Gregor, supranote 17, at 20.

98.
Well-organized coca farmers portray the cocaleros' struggle as a fight
for "Bolivian rights, culture and independence against capitalist exploitation and
U.S. imperialism." William R Long, 'CocaPower' Winning Bolivian Drug War, L.A.
TIMEs, Sept., 24, 1995, at Al.
99.
See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.

100. The United States provides equipment, facilities, and bonuses to the
prosecutors responsible for prosecuting crimes under the law. See ABA, supra
note 69, at 293.
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Bolivians often refer to Ley 1008 as the Ley de Extranjeros, or the
"Law of Foreigners." t0 1 Not surprisingly, coca production remains
steady and most Bolivians do not necessarily support large-scale
reduction.

III. INTERNATIONAL INvOLVEMENr IN BOLIVIA'S COCA INDUSTRY
Drug problems are not isolated within the boundaries of
particular countries, although some countries gain more notoriety

than others. Rather, narcotics consume much international time,
effort, and concern
international actions.

and

demand

legal

responses

from

A. The InternationalDrug Problem
The United States launched its war on cocaine in the 1980s
I0 2
because of increasing demand for cocaine within its borders.
While the use of powder cocaine decreased throughout the 1980s,
the use of rock, or crack, cocaine skyrocketed. I0 3 Although the
United States remains the biggest proponent of the war on drugs,
illicit drug trafficking has become a problem of truly international
proportions. Millions of people are involved in the production,
processing, and distribution of illegal drugs, as well as in related
industries such as money laundering. 10 4 The proceeds of the
international drug business are difficult to assess, but estimates
range from $150 to $500 billion a year.' 05 The trade stimulates
violent crime throughout many countries. As much as ninety
10 6
percent of U.S. violent crime is believed to be drug related,
while drugs account for as much as eighty-five percent of violent
07
crime in Canada and Western Europe. 1
International drug trafficking substantially impacts both
international and national security.
Drugs have strained

101.
102.
103.

See L at 292-93.
SANABRIA, supra note 22, at 58-9.
Id.

104. Klepak, supra note 8.
105. Id.; Omicinski, supra note 5. For an economic analysis of the
international drug trade, see Edward J. Nell, The Dynamics of the Drug Market,
CHALLENGE, Mar. 1994, at 13, availabe in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII File
(stating that the dynamics of supply and demand in the drug market not only
cause coca eradication efforts to fail, but also create increased levels of
production).
106. Kiepak, supranote 8.
107. Id.

836

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 30:817

relations between states 0 8 and have provided the basis for
foreign military interventions, such as the U.S. invasion of
Panama in 1989. Drugs have also financed wars, serving as the
main source of funds for some armed movements.' 0 9
Drug

organizations

have

encouraged

civil

unrest

within

several

countries; the link between drugs and local criminal elements is

often strong. Illicit drug trafficking has also threatened the
political and economic stability of many countries, including
Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and Bolivia." i0 The international drug
trade also threatens the national sovereignty of numerous

nations, because

nations cannot control the drugs passing

through or being produced within their borders.

This leads

powerful countries, such as the United States, to place great
pressure on lesser developed countries involved in the drug trade.
B.

U.N. NarcoticsEfforts

International recognition of the power and danger of drug
trafficking began as early as the 1909 Shanghai Opium
Conference, resulting in the International Opium Convention at
the Hague in 1912.111
The League of Nations established an
effective system in the 1920s and 1930s for controlling the

international production, trade, and use of dangerous drugs for
medical and scientific purposes."l

2

The U.N. has strengthened

108. Because most producer states are in the Southern Hemisphere and
most consumer states are in the Northern Hemisphere, an added strain is placed
on North-South relations. The United States intervention in Latin America Is a
prime example. Id.
109. Some of these areas include Lebanon and the Middle East, the
Balkans, the southern republics of the former USSR, Burma, Central America,
and Sri Lanka. Id. The taking of hostages at the Japan Ambassador's residence
by Peruvian Tupac Amaru rebels on December 17, 1996, has been suggested as
yet another example of drug-financed armed movements. Laurie Goering, In
Saving Hostages, Peru Raid May Have Doomed Movement, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 25,
1997, at 6.
110. Mexico and Colombia have been deemed "narco-states" by some
commentators. Omicinski, supra note 5. A "narco-state" Is the result of the
merger between the criminal elite class and the traditional elite class in the
common pursuit of illicit narcotics trafficking. Id. The repercussions are not only
felt in the Western Hemisphere; Burmese national cohesiveness has also been
shaken by connections between drugs and local forces. Klepak, supra note 8.
Several other Asian countries have also linked social unrest with drugs, because
drugs often provide an available source of funds for all Ideological groups. Id.
111. International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912, 8
L.N.T.S. 187.
112. See Jack Donnelly, The United Nations and the Global Drug Control
Regime, in DRUG POuCY INTHE AMERICAS, supranote 13, at 282.
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this system since 1945113 and has increased its involvement in
1 14
the international attack on drug abuse and drug trafficking.
The 1961 Single Convention shifted international attention from
controlling drugs used for medical and scientific purposes to
controlling drugs used for illicit purposes. 115
The U.N. has
recognized the increasingly international scope of the drug trade
in the last decade through three instruments:
the 1987
International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Traffic
(hereinafter 1987 Conference), the 1988 U.N. Convention Against
llicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
(hereinafter 1988 Convention), and the 1990 Seventeenth Special
Session of the General Assembly (hereinafter 1990 Special
1 16
Session), devoted to the control of drug abuse.
The 1987 Conference established the Comprehensive
Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse
Control (hereinafter CMO). 1 1 7 Although not designed as a formal

legal instrument, the CMO

provides

recommendations

for

1 18
measures to combat drug abuse and curb drug trafficking.

The 1987 Conference expands the scope of the 1961 Convention
by focusing attention on illicit demand and treatment for drug

abuse. It also calls for increased coordination among different

actors at both the national and international levels. 19 To control
drug supply, the CMO suggested strengthening the international
restriction of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 120 It

113. Although the U.N. adopted the general approach of the League of
Nations, it found it necessary to consolidate the international effort by 1960,
when six different drug control treaties and two amending protocols were in force.
Id. at 286. The 1961 Single Convention codified and strengthened earlier treaties.
It was amended by the 1972 Protocol, and is still one of the most important
documents of the international drug control regime. Its central principle is "to
limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture,
export, import, distribution of, trade in, use, and possession of drugs." Id.
114. Id.
115.
See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text. The 1961 Single
Convention, supra note 51, was later amended by the Protocol Amending the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 25, 1972, T.IAS. No. 8118, 976
U.N.T.S. 3 (strengthening the 1961 Single Convention to prevent the illicit
production and trafficking of narcotics).
116.
See Donnelly, supranote 112, at 288.
117.
See icL (citing the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit
Traffic, UN Doe. A/CONF.133/12, U.N. Sales No. E.87.I.18 (1987)).
118. The CMO addresses prevention and reduction of illicit demand,
controlling supply, illicit trafficking, and treatment and rehabilitation. The
emphases on demand and treatment reach beyond the 1961 Convention, which
was largely supply-oriented. See id.
119. Id. at 288-89 (explaining the Conference's emphasis on the
participation of various actors, such as national governments, institutions of
higher learning, research, and other academic bodies).
120. Id. at 289.
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also suggested the identification and elimination of illicit narcotic
plant cultivation, as well as the redevelopment of areas formerly
under illicit drug crop cultivation. 121
In its redevelopment
proposals, the CMO recognized many of the financial incentives of
poor farmers to cultivate illicit drugs. 1 2 2 While these proposals
were general, the plan recognized that the approach to the illicit
12 3
drug trade must be multifaceted.
The 1988 Convention was the first major effort by the U.N.
since 1973 to establish a set of norms to address the
international drug trafficking issue. 124 Because domestic laws
and international enforcement mechanisms had failed to control
the illicit drug trade, 125 the 1988 Convention endeavored to
establish an expansive set of laws and guidelines to be adopted by
all party states in fighting the illicit drug trade. The 1988
Convention essentially sought to foster a new international regime

12 6
to combat illicit drug trafficking.

The United States played an active role during the 1988
Convention. 12 7 Hence, the 1988 Convention implements much of
what the United States had already developed, both domestically

and bilaterally, in the area of illicit drug control. 128 For other
countries, however, the Convention provides new legal ideas and
mechanisms to address drug trafficking. 12 9 The 1988 Convention

requires party states to implement specific law enforcement

121.

Id.

122. Id. at 290. Previous supply-side efforts focused largely on eradication
without effectively addressing broader economic issues.
123. Id.
124. See David P. Stewart, Internationalzing the War on Drugs: The UN
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and PsychotropicSubstances, 18
DENv. J. INT'L L. & PoLY 387, 389-90 (1990); see also Donnelly, supranote 112, at

283 (stating that, although the global drug control regime is largely in the hands
of national, not international, actors, the norms developed by the U.N. to address
drug control are coherent, well-developed, and commended by many states).
125. See Stewart, supranote 124, at 387. Work on the Convention began In

1984. See kd.
126. See ic. The 1988 Convention gave force to the illicit trafficking
recommendations of the CMO. Donnelly, supranote 112, at 291.
127.

See Stewart, supra note 124, at 388. The Convention was adopted by

106 states by consensus at the U.N. Conference in Vienna and became binding
on November 11, 1990. See Sharon A. Gardner, Comment, A Global Initiative to
DeterDrug Trafficking: Will Intemationallzlng the Drug War Work?, 7 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 287, 294 (1993).

128. Donnelly, supra note 112, at 291 (noting that while this treaty was not
especially innovative, if it had attempted sweeping changes, it probably would not
have been ratified by enough states to give the treaty any significance). "The real
impact of any such treaty, if it is successful, will be to raise the average level and
intensity of activity among states to something much closer to the highest level
prevailing at the time." Id.
129. See Stewart, supra note 124, at 388.
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measures to improve their ability to identify, arrest, prosecute,
and convict those who traffic in illicit drugs.1 3 0 Included within
the Convention's provisions are new, stricter controls on the
international trade of previously unmonitored chemicals,
equipment, and other materials used in the covert manufacture of
drugs. 13 1 The Convention further requires party states to
cooperate with one another to suppress illicit drug trafficking by
13 2
sea or through the mails.
The U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the U.N.
International Narcotics Control Board monitor the operation of
the Convention and the responsibilities of party states.' 3 3 Article
3 of the Convention addresses offenses and sanctions under the
Convention, focusing on the drug trafficking and money
laundering activities that have the greatest international
impact. 13 4 The offenses and sanctions reflect many existing
provisions of U.S. law, and increase criminal regulation of the
international illicit drug trade. The Convention requires the

confiscation of property, proceeds, or instrumentalities used in or

derived from covered offenses. 135 The Convention also aims to
make it easier for prosecuting states
to obtain the extradition of
136
narcotics traffickers from overseas.
Article 6 amends existing extradition treaties between party
states to include offenses covered by Article 3(1) as extraditable
offenses; moreover, these offenses are extraditable between states
that do not make extradition conditional on an extradition
treaty. 137 The Convention also creates a general treaty obligation
for countries to enter mutual legal assistance treaties (hereinafter

130.

See id. at 391.

Bolivia's Ley 1008 specifically implements these

suggestions, as the entire process is streamlined. See supra notes 69-86 and
accompanying text.
131.
See Stewart, supra note 124, at 391.

132.

See id.

133. See UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINsr ILucrr TRAFFIC IN NARConc
DRUGS AND PsYcHoTRoPIc SUBsTANcEs, U.N. ESCOR, 6th plen. mtg., at 3. 26, 27,
U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 82/15 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 497 (1989) [hereinafter
1988 Convention].
134. See Stewart, supra note 124, at 392-94.
135.
1988 Convention, supra note 133, art. 5.
136. Id.

137.

Id. art. 6. In 1996, Bolivia and the United States signed an extradition

treaty. Bolivia Signs ExtraditionTreaty, supranote 9. The United States has been

urging countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean to sign extradition
treaties in an attempt to punish drug traffickers. The United States has signed
new extradition treaties with Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Antigua
and Barbuda, Granada, and Bolivia, but has met resistance from Mexico,
Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. Shelley Emling, Dominican Crninals
Escaping U.S. Justice,ATLANrAJ. & CONST., Apr. 13, 1997, at B7.
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MLATs). 13 8

MLATs allow courts of one state to obtain evidence
from abroad in a form admissible in the courts of the requesting
state. 13 9 In addition to these treaties, party states must provide
less formal types of law enforcement assistance, cooperation, and
training. 140
Under Article 12, parties to the Convention must take
appropriate measures to prevent the manufacture and
distribution of certain chemicals used for the illicit manufacturing
of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 14 1 Parties must
maintain monitoring systems for the international trade of such
chemicals and provide for the proper labeling and documentation
of chemicals imported or exported for any purpose. Parties must
also seize chemicals if sufficient evidence exists that they are
chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of a narcotic drug or

substance. 142 Under Article 13, parties must strive to prevent
trade in materials or equipment used for the illicit production or
43
manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 1
Although the Convention is largely aimed at suppressing
illicit drug trafficking, it also addresses the reduction of
production and demand. Under Article 14, each party state must
take appropriate measures to prevent the illicit cultivation of
plants containing psychotropic substances. These plants include
the opium poppy, the coca bush, and cannabis plants. Pursuant
to the Convention, parties must take measures at least as
stringent as those stipulated by the 1961 Single Convention or
the 1971 Psychotropic Substances Convention. 14 4 Further, party
states must take appropriate measures to eliminate or reduce
illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances
based on recommendations from U.N. bodies such as the World
Health Organization. 145 The Convention encourages bilateral and
multilateral agreements concerning interdiction and other law
enforcement activities. 1 4 6 Articles 20-23 and 32 outline the
1 47
supervising mechanisms of the Convention.

138. 1988 Convention, supranote 133, art. 7.
139. See Stewart, supranote 124, at 398-99.
140. See 1988 Convention, supra note 133, art. 9.
141. Id. art. 12. The targeted chemicals are listed In Tables I and II of the
Convention. Id. tbls. I & II.
142. 1988 Convention, supra note 133, art. 12.
143. I. art. 13.
144. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543,
1019 U.N.T.S. 175.
145. See Stewart, supranote 124, at 403.
146. 1988 Convention, supranote 133, art. 10(3).
147. See Gardner, supranote 127, at 297.
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Although the 1988 Convention binds party states, 148 the
international scope of the drug problem appears to have worsened
since the Convention was ratified.
The effect of the 1988
Convention on the Andean coca-producing states has been
questionable. Although Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia have signed
the Convention, only Bolivia and Peru have ratified it. 1 4 9 Bolivia
ratified the Convention in 1989, after heightened criticism of its
drug policies by the United States.1 5 0 The Convention's Articles

5, 12, 13, and 14, addressing drug production, focus on efforts
that the Andean countries can make to help achieve the goals of
the Convention. 1 5 1
The Bush Administration signed major
chemical control agreements with Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia to
facilitate law enforcement checks on the legitimacy of chemical
shipments. 152 As a party state to the Convention, Bolivia is
expected to uphold its treaty obligations.
The U.N. General Assembly created a new U.N. International
Drug Control Programme in 1990 by integrating the three existing
U.N. anti-drug units: the U.N. Division of Narcotic Drugs, the
International Narcotics Control Board, and the U.N. Fund for
Drug Abuse Control. 15 3 By merging the three organizations, the
U.N. sought to improve coordination and eliminate duplicative
efforts.1 54 Two recommendations by the U.N. General Assembly
specifically affect Andean countries. First, the U.N. recommends
that both source and transit states investigate chemical
shipments to prevent their use in illicit drug trafficking. Second,
governments should pass laws to control and monitor precursor
chemicals used in the production of cocaine and other covertly
produced drugs.' 5 5 The 1990 Special Session produced the

148.

As of January 1, 1996, more than 100 states had either ratified or

acceded to the 1988 Convention. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FoRCE 401
(1996) (listing more than 100 states that had ratified the 1988 Convention).
149.
See Gardner, supra note 127, at 301-04.

150. In 1988, President Bush encouraged Bolivia to do more to stop the
spread of coca cultivation, suggesting enforcement of Bolivia's anti-narcotics law
and forceful eradication programs. See id. at 303. The United States also called
for intensified Bolivian interdiction activities to disrupt cocaine processing and to
encourage farmers to seek alternate livelihoods because of shrinking coca

markers. See ic.
151.

See supra notes 133-44 and accompanying text.

152.
See Gardner, supranote 127, at 295 n.75.
153.
See id. at 298.
154. See Id. The U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, created in 1946 by
the U.N. Economic and Social Council, still functions as the policy-making body
in the U.N. with respect to drug issues. See I&. This Commission and the

integrated U.N. International Drug Control Programme report to the U.N.
Secretary-General under Article 20 of the 1988 Convention. See id. at 299.
155. See id. at 298.
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Political Declaration and Global Programme of Action. 156 This
declaration reaffirmed the need for "strategies that are
comprehensive
and
multidisciplinary,"
emphasizing
the
relationships among demand, production, supply, trafficking, and
distribution. 15 7 The declaration states that international support
will be provided for "viable alternative income schemes" in
developing countries and for control efforts in developing transit
58

countries. 1

The U.N. has established a normative framework for an
international approach to the drug problem. The report of the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs to the 1990 Special Session
summarized the consensus on several general principles,
including the belief that existing treaties provide a firm basis for
current action. 15 9 The challenge since the 1990 Special Session,
however, has been implementing and enforcing its political
consensus. 160 The norms created by the 1988 Convention and
the political declaration of the 1990 Special Session form the
background for international involvement in the illicit drug trade.
With respect to enforcement of these strategies, however, national
actors still play the largest roles in the intemational drug
scene. 16 1 Thus, although the U.N. has provided international
norms, unilateral and bilateral action initiated by the United
States still accounts for the majority of drug control efforts in the
Andean region.

156. G.A. Res. 5-17/2, U.N. GAOR, 17th Special Sess., 8th plen. mtg.,
Annex, Agenda Items 14 and 15, U.N. Doe. A/RES/S-17/2 (1990).
157. Donnelly, supra note 112, at 291 (citing para. 6 of the Political
Declaration).
158. Id. at 292 (citing para. 13 of the Political Declaration). Transit

countries often do not produce any illicit drugs, but become involved during the
transport of the substances. I. Developing transit countries include Mexico, the
Bahamas, and Panama. Id.

159. The report stated the other principles: The CMO provides an adequate
basis for developing new national policies states have primary responsibility for
drug control, but international cooperation Is necessary to support states;
success ultimately depends on reducing demand; a comprehensive, multisectoral
approach is necessary; the U.N. role needs to be expanded; and additional
financial resources are required. See i. at 293.
160. The U.N. Administrative Committee on Coordination said: The major
task before the international community now Is to translate this unanimous
political commitment of Governments into effective action." Id. (quoting
E/1990/18, paragraph 5).
161. Id. at 302 (suggesting that the global drug control regime will probably
remain restricted mainly to promotion and assistance activities. Assistance may
include the areas of forensic science, law enforcement, and information and
resources in prevention and treatment).
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IV. HEMISPHERIC STRATEGY
Although the international community has attempted to
control drug production and trafficking, at most it sets
international goals and boundaries. Regional and national actors
propose more short-term concrete agenda for narcotics control.
The United States and Latin America play major roles in the drugcontrol arena.
A. U.S. Efforts to Stop DrugProductionand Trafficking
Although the illicit drug trade plagues much of the
international community, the United States remains the most
vocal and forceful nation in its demand that the illicit trafficking
of drugs be stopped. The United States has enacted various laws
in its attempts to curb the international production and flow of
illicit drugs. In Bolivia, U.S. involvement has been constant and
6 2
indicative of its policy toward other Andean nations.1
Although prior U.S. administrations made modest efforts, the
international scope of the U.S. war on cocaine was heightened
under President Reagan. The Reagan Administration initiated
more law enforcement efforts to reduce supply and demand,
163
focusing relatively little attention on treatment and prevention.
Congress passed amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act in
1986,164 allowing itself to suspend economic aid to countries
uncooperative in the U.S. drug effort. The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse
Act declared drug control a top priority in U.S. foreign policy and
created the certification system, which is still the key enforcement
tool in the Andean region. Under the certification system, the
United States uses foreign economic aid to pressure foreign

162. Peru and Colombia have resisted more of the U.S. efforts in years past.
The presidency of Alberto Fujimori in Peru signified a more cooperative
relationship, and one less affected by terrorist insurgencies such as those by the
Shining Path ("Sendero Luminoso") guerrillas. The Wages of Prohibition,
EcONOMIsr, Dec. 24, 1994, at 21. In Colombia, the Colombian government made

efforts to dismantle the MedeUin cartel, which U.S. officials claimed was
responsible for 80% of the cocaine reaching the United States during the 1980s.
Id. In 1993, Colombian security forces killed Medellin leader Pablo Escobar, but
the cocaine traffickdng business was not greatly affected. Id.
163. Sandi R. Murphy, Note, Drug Diplomacy and the Supply-Side Strategy:
A Survey of United States Practice. 43 VMND. L REV. 1259, 1262 (1990). The drug

law enforcement budget rose from $468.1 million in 1979 to $695 million in
1982. Id. at n.17. The budget for drug treatment declined from $404.8 million to
$206.4 million in the same period. Id.
164. 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (1988) (as amended by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 2005, 100 Stat. 3207-61 to -62 (1986)) (authorizing
withholding aid from drug-producing countries).
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governments to establish domestic drug control measures.165 The
President

must

"certify"

that

drug-producing

nations

are

cooperating with the United States in fighting drug production
and trafficking or are taking sufficient steps on their own. 166 If a
country is "decertified," the United States will cease aid and
oppose World Bank and other multilateral development loans.
Hence, the decertifled country will be branded a drug-trafficking
nation. 16 7 Although certification is employed as a big stick in
U.S. drug diplomacy, some commentators argue it has had no
16 8
impact on drug production or trafficking thus far.
Increased international efforts to control illicit drug
trafficking largely failed; drug supplies to the United States
increased from 1986 to 1988.169 Congress then passed the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988, which set aside fifty percent of the 1989
drug budget for domestic efforts to control U.S. demand, to be
increased to sixty percent in subsequent years.' 70 Although the
1988 Act did not change the unilateral strategies of the 1986 Act,
such as the U.S. certification system, it did call for increased
multilateral and regional involvement in controlling the
17 1
international drug trade.
In 1989, President Bush announced an anti-drug plan
heavily focused on international action. 172 The Andean Strategy

165.

These

measures

included

crop

eradication,

law

enforcement

militarization, extradition of foreign nationals, and mutual legal assistance for
prosecution. Murphy, supranote 163. at 1263. Under this plan, 75% of the total
drug budget was set aside for programs to control the supply of drugs. Id.
166. Falco, PassingGrades, supranote 2, at 15.
167. Id. In 1995, decertification would have eliminated $81 million In U.S.
assistance for Bolivia and jeopardized $350 million in Inter-American
Development Bank loans. Id. at 18.
168. Id. at 19. While countries do not want to be decertifled, they have
been criticized for attempting to meet U.S. standards of cooperation without truly
attacking the problem of drug trafficking. Id. The recent development in Mexico
is a prime example: one week before President Clinton was to decide on whether
Mexico would be certified for 1997. Mexico's top anti-drug liaison to the United
States, General Jesus Gutierrez Robello, was accused of taking bribes from a
drug lord. Starr's Cr.edibility Takes Another Flip, TENNESSEAN, Feb. 25, 1997, at
6A, availablein LEXIS, News Library, TENNES File.
169. Falco, PassingGrades, supranote 2. at 16.
170. Murphy, supra note 163, at 1263; see Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). While President Bush increased the
international efforts of the U.S. anti-drug struggle in subsequent years, President
Clinton has increased focus on domestic treatment programs.
171. Murphy, supra note 163, at 1264. The 1988 Convention adopted
many U.S. enforcement strategies. Id. at 1264. Since the 1988 law, several
hemispheric summits have addressed the drug issue. See infra notes 227-50 and
accompanying text.
172. Under this plan, about 70% of the U.S. drug control budget was
devoted to curbing the international flow of drugs. HARGREAVES, supranote 26, at
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was to be a five-year plan under which the United States would
pledge $2.5 billion to Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia beginning in
1989.173 Although the international drug control budget no
longer outweighs the domestic budget, Bush's Andean Strategy
17 4
still forms the backdrop for U.S. law and policy in the region.
The strategy was a mixture of "carrot and stick" measures,
divided into three main areas: law enforcement, crop eradication,
and economic assistance. Law enforcement entailed interrupting
drug traffickers' activities and seizing their assets before cocaine
reached the United States.
Measures included destroying
processing
laboratories,
seizing
airplanes,
tracing
and
imprisoning leaders of major trafficking organizations, and
17 5
blocking shipment of chemicals needed to process cocaine.
Eradication plans called for the destruction of coca plants in
Bolivia and Peru. By eradicating coca, U.S. policy-makers hoped
to eliminate cocaine. Coca fields are easily visible from the air,
and coca farmers are not well-armed traffickers. 17 6 Although the
cheapest way to eradicate coca is to uproot the plants by hand,
this proved too slow and dangerous. 177
In 1987, scientists
developed a herbicide that could be sprayed from the air and
appeared to be environmentally safe. 17 8 A 1987 State Department
report in Peru encouraged the use of the herbicide, and U.S.
diplomats in Peru persuaded the government to start testing it,
but environmentalists worried it was unsafe. 179 U.S. support for
the use of herbicides in eradicating coca fields eventually
18 1
diminished, 180 and Bolivia's Ley 1008 outlawed their use.

18. The international component of Bush's plan was called his Andean Strategy.
Id.
173. Id.

174.

President Clinton shifted much of the drug control budget to domestic

treatment programs in 1993, but has reinvigorated the U.S. international drug
policy with the appointment of General Barry McCaffrey. James Kitfield, FourStar Czar, 28 NAT'LJ. 819-21 (1996).
175. See HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 18.
176. Id. at 19.
177. In Peru, 32 eradication workers were killed between 1982 and 1988.

Id. Eradication efforts were suspended for more than a year. Id.
178. Id. The herbicide's name was Tebuthiuron, known as "Spike."
179. Id. Environmentalists said that Spike was an "indiscriminate
defoliant" that might cause serious harm to the ecosystem of the Andean jungle.
Id. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency also warned that, if Spike entered
the ground water, it could contaminate water supplies. Id.
180.

Id. at 20. In 1988, Spike's only manufacturer, Eli Lilly & Company,

refused to sell the herbicide to the State Department for coca eradication because
it was worried about potential environmental litigation, as well as retaliation
against its employees by drug traffickers. Id.

181. See Ley 1008, art. 7. Peruvian President Fujimori allowed U.S.
scientists to continue tests, but did not approve the use of the herbicide.
HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 20.
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The third area of the Andean Strategy was economic aid.
Under the Bush plan, crop substitution and other economic
revitalization programs would be implemented after law
18 2
enforcement made countries safe and free of coca fields.
Although U.S. aid is significant to the Andean region, so are
revenues from cocaine. While the United States provided $98.5
million in economic aid to Bolivia in 1991, cocaine adds between
1 83
$300 and $600 million a year to the Bolivian economy.
The Andean Strategy implemented under the Bush
Administration remains largely intact, although President Clinton
has shifted some U.S. funds from interdiction to .domestic
treatment efforts.' 84 The Director of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy prepared the National Drug Control Strategy and
through the President submitted it to Congress in 1996. It states
strategic goals to reduce illicit drug use in the United States.
Three of the goals, as well as the majority of funding and effort,
directly relate to actions against the production, traffic, and abuse
of illicit drugs within the United States. 185 Assistant Secretary of
State for International Narcotics Matters Robert S. Gelbard said
that the basic U.S. policy goal in international narcotics control is
"to preserve our national security."' 8 6 He also stated that the
roots of the U.S. drug problem "lie abroad, as much as at

home." 187

Thus, the United States still views illicit drug

trafficking as largely an imported problem and still believes extraterritorial solutions are necessary. This U.S. notion forms the
basis for much of its legislation and policy in Bolivia, as well as in
the rest of Latin America. It also fuels the tension between the
United States as a cocaine consumer and Bolivia as a coca and
cocaine producer.

182.

I. at 21.

183.
184.

Id.
Falco, U.S. Drug Policy, supra note 3, at 122-23; see Infra notes 185-87

and accompanying text.
185. Prepared Statement of Robert S. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary of State,
Before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation Subcommittee, and Senate Caucus on International
Narcotics Control, Fed. News Service, Sept. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, FEDNEW File. Gelbard also described the increasingly global nature of
drug trafficking, as cocaine Is moving through many different routes: "Mexico has
emerged as the single largest transit avenue and we are seeing new routes by way
of Brazil to Europe, and by sea and air to East Asia. Cocaine is emerging in
Eastern European countries once principally familiar with heroin." Id.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
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B. JointBolivian-UnitedStates Cooperation
In 1987, Bolivia and the United States signed the Narcotic
Drugs Agreement and pledged cooperation against narcotic
trafficking. 18 8
The governments agreed to share joint and
reciprocal responsibility for the campaign against narcotics
production, trafficking, and consumption. 18 9 The parties agreed
to a "Three-Year Plan to Combat Narcotics Trafficking" in which
both governments would shoulder coordinated efforts to eliminate
the cocaine problem and effect a strategy for the interdiction and
reduction of coca cultivation.' 9 0
The treaty defined cocaine
trafficking as a crime consisting of the "illegal processing of coca
leaves by transformation of the raw material into a paste, base, or
hydrochloride and the international marketing and consumption
of those products." 19 1 The governments asserted that the most
effective strategy for dealing with the narcotics problem would be

to heighten public awareness, interdict trafficking, eradicate

192
surplus crops, and assist rural agricultural development.
Under the treaty, the United States agreed to loan Bolivia
helicopters, support Bolivian forces responsible for interdicting
narcotics and eradicating coca crops, and provide other
operational support. 193 Bolivia agreed to make every effort to
enact a narcotics law prohibiting coca cultivation, except for the
amount necessary to meet legal demand. 9 4 Bolivia also agreed to
implement both voluntary and compulsory coca eradication
programs, with financial and technical support from the United
19 5
States.
Annex I of the treaty outlines the interdiction program, with
its stated goal to eliminate production and narcotics trafficking in
Bolivia. 19 6 The components of the interdiction program include
targeting
and
destroying
narcotics-buying
organizations,

188. Agreement on Narcotic Drugs, Feb. 24, 1987, U.S.-Bolivia, T.IA.S. No.
12053 [hereinafter Narcotic Drugs Agreement].
189.

Id. at 9.

190.

Id. The Bolivian government agreed to apply the Three-Year Plan

throughout its territory. The Plan included programs for interdiction and rural

development, including the eradication of surplus coca crops. Id.
191.

Id. at 8.

192. Id.
193. Id. at 9.
194. Id.
195. Id. Bolivia agreed to eradicate a minimum of 1800 hectares of coca
within one year of the commencement of the program, with eradication for
following years to be set forth in operational letters before each 12-month period.
Id. at 10.
196. Id., Annex I, at 12. A precondition to the goal of eliminating narcotics
production and traffcking is the reduction of the price of coca leaf destined for
the narcotics trade to less than its cost of production. Id.
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controlling the traffic of precursor chemicals, controlling and
destroying clandestine airstrips, improving Bolivian law
enforcement efforts, and seizing property used in the production,
marketing, and storage of narcotics.' 9 7 These target areas are the
most realistic in terms of gaining Bolivian national support,
because they lie at the heart of criminal narcotics processing
activity and reach beyond merely producing coca leaves.
Annex II sets the framework for the Three-Year Anti-Narcotics
Plan. The Three-Year Plan incorporates four sub-programs:
agricultural
transition,
economic
reactivation,
regional
development, and narcotics awareness and rehabilitation. 198 The
agricultural transition sub-program attempts to provide economic
assistance to farmers who voluntarily eradicate all the illegal coca
they produce and to facilitate the transition of coca farmers to
legal income-generating activities. 199 The economic reactivation
sub-program seeks to provide farmers in large coca-producing
regions with credit resources to expand their legal agricultural
200
productivity and enable them to begin economic reactivation.
The sub-program for regional development seeks to develop
productive and social infrastructure in the regions affected by the
Three-Year Plan to improve the quality of life for people in these
regions. 2 0 I The narcotics awareness and rehabilitation subprogram attempts to provide assistance and resources for projects
promoting narcotics awareness and rehabilitation through both
public and private

efforts.

202

This Three-Year Plan reflects both the long-term solution to
Bolivian involvement in the production of coca for cocaine and the
reason it will fail. Although the solution to Bolivia's involvement
197.
198.
199.
in excess
200.
201.

IcL, Annex I, at 13-14.
Id., Annex I, at 23-24.
This sub-program seeks to help in the voluntary eradication of all coca
of the legal amount for consumption. Id., Annex II. at 23.
Id.
This program sought to continue and reinforce efforts already started

by the Bolivian government through projects already receiving the cooperation of
USAID/Bolivia, UNFDAC, and other agencies of the U.N. I., Annex I, at 24.
Emphasis was given to basic social services and infrastructure, such as health,
education, rural road improvement, irrigation infrastructure, as well as to
improving research, extension, and commercialization of agricultural production.

IdL
202.

Interestingly, although most reports state that Bolivia did not have a

drug abuse problem in the 1980s, the program included efforts to inform the

public about the dangers to Bolivian society resulting from the production and
consumption of narcotics. The program also sought to inform the public about
the threat narcotics production and consumption posed to democracy and to
social and economic development. Addressing the rehabilitation component of
the sub-program, resources would be provided for the development and
improvement of drug addiction treatment centers. This sub-program was to serve
as a basic support for the other three sub-programs. Icd., Annex II, at 24.
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in illicit drug production and trafficking will come only with
economic revitalization, a bilateral treaty with the United States
will not provide the mammoth growth needed for such a
transformation. Bolivia's poverty lies deep within its agricultural
one-crop export economy. It is perpetuated by external debt and
internal mismanagement. These deep-seeded economic and social
problems cannot be solved as a corollary to the U.S. war on

cocaine. They call for separate and far-reaching measures that
must address the sole issue of economic revitalization, not illicit
drug control.
Under the 1987 treaty, Bolivia agreed to provide at least
twenty percent of the total cost of the four sub-programs, while
the United States agreed to provide "most of" or "the bulk of"the
remaining necessary resources to implement the Three-Year Plan
successfully. 20 3 Bolivia also agreed to seek third-party financial
contributions to meet the requirements of the Plan, and the
United States agreed to provide full diplomatic support to help
Bolivia secure such assistance. 20 4 Again, U.S. assistance is
conditioned on Bolivia's fulfillment of its treaty obligations,
namely coca eradication and reduction of other illicit drug
activities.
The Narcotic Drugs Agreement was amended and
supplemented

by

a

second

agreement

in

1990.205

The

Supplemental Agreement remains focused on supply reduction
and trafficking interdiction, although more attention was given to
the illicit products derived from coca than to coca eradication
itself. This agreement incorporates the previous 1987 treaty
between the two parties, Ley 1008,206 and the 1990 Declaration of
Cartagena. 20 7 The 1990 treaty outlines additional cooperation
between Bolivia and the United States. It also addresses demand
reduction, economic cooperation for alternative development, and
the interdiction and suppression of drug trafficking. 2 08 The
203. Id., Annex I, at 24-25.
204. Id., Annex If, at 26. Bolivia also agreed to make every effort to use the
resources that it has received or may receive from other donors, such as the IDB,
IBRD, and the U.N., to meet the requirements of the Three-Year Plan. Id., Annex
I.
205. Agreement Concerning Cooperation to Combat Narcotics Trafficking,
May 9. 1990, U.S.-Bolivia, Hein's No. KAV 2505, Temp. State Dept. No. 90-161
(amending & supplementing the Narcotic Drugs Agreement, supra note 188)
[hereinafter Supplemental Agreement].
206. See supranotes 69-101 and accompanying text.
207. See infra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.

208.

The governments agreed that the most effective strategy to combat the

drug trafficking problem requires basic concepts, defined at
Summit: (1) to increase prevention for the general public and
political will and institutional capability to fight drug trafficking;
alternative development to assist in the permanent reduction

the Cartagena
strengthen the
(2) to promote
of illegal coca
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primary goals of the amended program focus on promoting
alternative development; eliminating illicit products derived from
coca, such as coca paste and cocaine hydrochloride; reducing
illegal coca cultivation; and eliminating installations used to make
20 9
cocaine.
The revised Annex I explains the interdiction program,
entailing increased efforts by the Bolivian Special Force, the
primary interdiction agency within this anti-narcotics program.
Bolivia agreed to continue supplying the necessary legal
authority, political support, personnel, and material resources
within its means to fight the illegal production and trafficking of
narcotics within Bolivia. 2 10 The United States declared its firm
intention to continue supplying financial and technical support to

the Bolivian government during the2 1 1implementation of Its

program to combat narcotics trafficking.
Further recognizing the tremendous economic incentives
underlying the production of illicit coca, the governments agreed
to develop programs to offer economic alternatives to coca farmers
under the revised Annex J1.212 Bolivia and the United States
formulated a Social Compensation Fund to alleviate the shortterm economic and social impacts that eradicating coca crops will
have on coca farmers. Annex II also provides for a Balance of
Payments Program. 2 13 This Program recognizes the need for
foreign exchange, particularly U.S. dollars, to provide balance of
payments assistance in support of the Bolivian government's
efforts of economic stabilization, reactivation, and alternative
development.2 14 The long-range goal of alternative development

cultivation and replace income, employment and foreign exchange, which are
generated by the coca economy; and (3) to Increase the effectiveness of the
Bolivian organization charged with the fight against drugs, and to equip units of
the Bolivian Armed Forces to participate in anti-narcotics actions. Supplemental
Agreement, supranote 205, at 2-3.
209. Id. at 3-4.
210. Id., Annex I, at 4. Bolivia agreed to make a concerted effort to reduce
the amount of excess coca by at least 5,000 hectares during 1990 in accordance
with Article 10, Ley 1008; to conduct forced eradication of illicit excess coca as
provided in Ley 1008; to interdict, seize, and destroy significant quantities of
cocaine HCL, base, and paste as well as processing facilities in accordance with

Bolivian law, to investigate, arrest, and prosecute major cocaine traffickers; and
to sign in 1990 an effective bilateral extradition treaty with the U.S. government.
Id., Annex
211.
212.
213.

I, at 6-7.
IcL, Annex 1, at 4.
Id., AnnexII, at 1.
Id., Annex l,at 3.

214. Id. In fiscal year 1989, $17,625,000 was provided by the United States
for balance of payments support. Id. For fiscal year 1990, $18,000,000 was
proposed under the agreement. Id. The United States also agreed to seek to
renew its assistance to the balance of payments program from 1991 to 1994. Id.
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in Bolivia was separated into two categories under Annex II:
current projects in the coca growing areas and new projects to be
implemented in potential population exporting zones. 2 15 The
current projects include agricultural transition, 2 1 6 economic
reactivation, 2 17 regional development, 2 18 and narcotics awareness
and prevention. 2 19
Although the revised treaty increases
attention to long-term development, financial aid for this still
hinges on continued coca and cocaine reduction rather than
Bolivia's inherent need for economic progress.
The Supplemental Agreement not only revised Annexes I and
II of the 1987 treaty, but also added Annex III, expanding Bolivian
220
Armed Forces participation in the Counter Narcotics Program.
Under Annex III, the United States agreed to transfer defense
articles and services to enhance the capabilities of Bolivia's Armed
Forces to participate in counter-narcotics activities. 22 1 The
participation of Bolivian Armed Forces conformed with the 1962
Agreement with the United

States,

22 2

Ley

1008,223

and the

215. Id, Annex H, at 4.
216. These programs follow those laid out in the Narcotic Drugs Agreement.
See supra notes 188-204 and accompanying text. The agricultural transition
sub-program was established to provide economic assistance to farmers in
transition zones, who voluntarily make substantial reductions in the portion of

their land devoted to coca cultivation. This sub-program provides assistance to
aid the transition from coca production to alternative income-generating
activities. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 205, at Annex I, 405.
217. The economic reactivation sub-program provides the population in
affected regions with credit resources and technical assistance to expand their
productive capacity and allow them to begin economic reactivation. Id., Annex II,
at 5.
218. The regional development sub-program seeks to develop productive
and social infrastructure in affected regions to improve the quality of life and
expand productive capacity there. Icd, Annex II at 6. This sub-program
reinforces efforts already started by the Bolivian Government through projects
that cooperate with USAID/Bolivia, UNFDAC, and other U.N. agencies. It., Annex
II, at 6-7.
219. Id., Annex II, at 7.
220. Id., Annex l, at 1.
221. On April 26, 1962, Bolivia and the United States agreed that defense
articles and services could be furnished to Bolivia for the purpose of contributing
to its internal security capabilities. Under the 1990 Supplemental Agreement, the
governments agreed that the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics, by
their nature and their violation of both nations' laws, constituted a danger to
internal security. Bolivia agreed, however, that it will not permit the use of such
defense articles and services for any purpose other than narcotics control. Id.,
Annex II, at 5. Speculation exists, however, that Bolivia is merely using its antidrug campaign as a front to obtain military equipment from the United States,
which Bolivia can then use to build up its own Armed Forces.
222. Id., Annex I, at 1.
223. Id.
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Cartagena Agreement. 224 The United States agreed to provide as
much as $33,228,000 in Military Assistance Program funds,

subject to the availability of funds and Bolivia's 225
progress in
attaining the objectives of the anti-narcotics program.
The increased militarization of the drug control effort
understandably raised concerns among the Bolivian population.
Because it was under military control from 1964 to 1982, Bolivia's
decade-old democracy does not take increased military action
lightly. Bolivia also remembers U.S. military involvement in other
volatile Latin American situations, such as in Nicaragua, El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Panama. Increased military aid from
the United States thus raises multiple concerns among Bolivians,
who value highly their democracy and sovereignty in light of their
22 6

tumultuous past.

C. Inter-AmericanRegionalAction

On the regional level, several initiatives have been developed

to address the drug issue in Latin America.

The first such

agreement was the South American Agreement on Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances (hereinafter ASEP), created in 1976
by ten South American countries. 2 27 By coordinating studies and

programs concerning the needs of the member states, ASEP has
attempted to promote cooperation among the countries of the

224.

Declaration of Cartagena Concerning the Production of, Trafficking In

and Demand for Illicit Drugs, Feb. 15, 1990, Hein's No. KAV 2908, Temp. State
Dept. No. 90-88 [hereinafter Declaration of Cartagena]. The Cartagena Agreement
states: 'The control of illegal trafficking In drugs is essentially a law enforcement
matter. However, because of its magnitude and the different aspects involved,
and in keeping with the sovereign interest of each State and its own judicial
system, the armed forces in each of the countries, within their own territory and
national jurisdictions, may also participate. The Parties may establish bilateral
and multilateral understandings for cooperation in accordance with their
interests, needs, and priorities." Id. at 6.
225.
Supplemental Agreement, supra note 205, at Annex III, 3.
226. As the Cold War ended, the U.S. Armed Forces became more active in
anti-drug efforts. Klepak, supra note 8. The U.S. military's main contributions
have been detecting and monitoring equipment, as well as intelligence
information. Newman, supra note 4, at 41. In 1994, however, the drugs portion
of the defense budget was cut, as were programs of assistance to those
cooperating with the U.S. Armed Forces in drug interdiction. Klepak, supra note
8. But, although the U.S. military is reducing Its participation in combating drug
trafficking, worldwide military Involvement in drug control is growing. Id.
227.
Irving Tragen, World-Wide and Regional Anti-Drug Prirams,in DRUGS
AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 7, at 155, 172; see also C.N. Cagliotti, Cooperation
between South American Countries in the Struggle Against Drug Abuse and Illicit
Drug Traffcking, United Nations Bulletin on Narcotics, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, Jan.Mar. 1987, pp. 61-67 (describing the ASEP program).
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continent. 2 28 Similar multi-country programs were created in the
22 9
Caribbean and in Central America.

The inter-American region, comprised of South America,
Central America, the Caribbean, and North America, initiated a
regional program in 1986. The Organization of the American

States (hereinafter OAS) adopted the Inter-American Program of
Action of Rio de Janeiro against the Illicit Use and Production of
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and Trafficking
Therein (hereinafter Program of Rio). It also set up the InterAmerican Drug Abuse Control Commission (hereinafter CICAD) to
implement the program. 230 The Program of Rio developed longterm measures to reduce drug supply and demand at the national
and regional levels. 23 1 It recommends that governments establish
commissions to implement national efforts and also specifies
regional measures to support national programs, with CICAD
23 2
serving as the overall monitor and coordinator.
In 1990, at the Meeting of Ministers Alliance of the Americas
Against Drug Trafficking in Ixtapa, Mexico reaffirmed the goals of
the Program of Rio. 2 3 3 As in the. Program of Rio, the CICAD was

228.

ASEP supports seven training centers in South America: (1) treatment

and rehabilitation in Buenos Aires, Argentina; (2) preventive education in
Caracas, Venezuela; (3) suppression of illicit drug trafficking in Lima, Peru; (4)
documentation in Buenos Aires; (5) customs in Brasilia, Brazil; (6) training of
dogs for anti-drug law enforcement in Buenos Aires; and (7) regulation of the use
of licit drugs in Santiago, Chile. Tragen. supra note 227, at 172-73.
229. The Secretariat of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) developed a Caribbean regional program to deal with law
enforcement, epidemiology, education, treatment and rehabilitation. Id. at 173.

Since the mid-1980s, extensive programs in each of these fields have been
started.

Id. In Central America. the governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador,

Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua established the Permanent Central
American Commission for the Eradication of the Production, Traffic, Consumption
and Use of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and Related Offenses
(CCP) in December 1990. Id. The goal of the CCP Is to establish cooperation
between the governments to deal with common drug issues. Id. The CCP has
met several times and is developing its organization and working on a program of
action. Id.
230. Id. For texts of the Inter-American Program of Action of Rio de Janeiro
Against the Illicit Use and Production of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, see Resolution AG/Res. 813 and 814 of the OAS General Assembly.
OAS Resolution AG/Res. 813 (XVI-0/86) created the CICAD. Id. at 183 n.39.
231. The Program of Rio placed the highest priority on efforts to reduce
demand, including education for prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation.
Tragen, supra note 227, at 174.
232. Id. at 173. The Program of Rio also highlighted the need to integrate
legislation among member states, authorize the forfeiture of assets derived from
illicit drug trafficking, control precursors and other chemicals used in the
production of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, support crop
substitution and eradication of illicit production, and fashion effective cooperation
among anti-drug agencies among countries of the region. Id. at 174-75.
233. Id. at 173.
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directed to coordinate its efforts with other multilateral worldwide,
regional, and sub-regional organizations working on the drug
problems of the inter-American region. 23 4 Because problems are
similar at the worldwide and regional levels, the governments
encouraged inter-agency cooperation and coordination. 2 3 5 The
Meeting of Ministers ranked ratification of the 1988 U.N.
Convention Against Illicit Traffic as a top priority for OAS member
states. 2 3 6
The CICAD adopted five priority measures to
implement the programs of Rio and Ixtapa: legal development,
education for prevention, community mobilization, a uniform
inter-American statistical system, and an inter-American drug
237
information system.
The first Andean drug summit meeting assembled In
Cartagena, Colombia, on February 15, 1990.238 The summit
reflects positive regional efforts to attack drug trafficking from
both the supply and demand sides of the problem, while also
recognizing the economic roots of the issue. The presidents of
Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and the United States pledged to
cooperate in a joint attack against every facet of the drug trade
and to exchange information on the flow of precursor chemicals
and drug money.2 39 In the Declaration of Cartagena, the parties
agreed to work to reduce demand for illicit drugs, to act within a
framework that respects human rights, and to work together to
increase trade, development, and the marketing of new
exports. 2 4 0
The United States agreed to finance activities
fostering sound economic policies, including programs for
alternative development and crop substitution, as well as to
facilitate private investment in areas where economic conditions
are favorable. The parties reaffirmed their goals of reducing the

net cultivation of coca, cooperating in law enforcement, and

24 1
increasing public awareness of drug control issues.
This summit provides a stark, yet workable, outline for future
action between the Andean countries and the United States. If
the United States is to remain involved in the South American
drug production network, which appears likely, it must continue

234. Id. at 174.
235. The CMO and the Global Plan of Action, adopted by the U.N. in 1987
and 1990 respectively, are very similar to the Programs of Rio and Ixtapa. Id.
236. Id. at 175.

237. For a summary of these measures, see kIdat 175-79. The 1988 U.N.
Convention serves as the juridical framework for the legal development adopted
by the CICAD. Id. at 175-76.
238. Raphael F. Perl, U.S.-Andean Drug Policy, in DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE
AMERIcAS, supra note 7, at 26.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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to demonstrate its cooperation in the multifaceted, long-term
struggle against all parts of the drug situation. The Andean
summit of 1990 should facilitate broader levels of communication
and coordination, if vigorously supported by the Andean countries

themselves. Thus, U.S. and international economic aid to Andean
nations should no longer hinge on cooperation in the U.S. war on
drugs and should instead be provided to tackle Andean
underdevelopment and dependency on the coca trade.
In 1994, the heads of the governments from the Western
Hemisphere attended the Summit of the Americas to address
problems throughout the region. 24 2 The governments pledged to
strengthen enforcement cooperation and to act against various
criminal problems. 2 43 The Plan of Action addressed the problem
of corruption in both public and private sectors as a threat to
democracy and government legitimacy.2 4 4 Governments agreed to
combat illicit drug trafficking through a broad hemispheric
strategy designed to reduce drug use and production. 2 45 The

242. Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action,
Dec. 11, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 808 (1995) [hereinafter Summit of the Americas].
243. Bruce Zagaris. InternationalSecurity in the Post-Cold War Era: Can
InternationalLaw Truly Effect Global Politicaland Economic Stability?Constructing a
Hemispheric Initiative Against Transnational Crime. 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1888,

1892 (1996).
244. Corruption may be reduced through the modernization of the state,
including deregulation, privatization, and simplification of government
procedures. Id. The governments agreed to a number of initiatives to reduce
corruption in the Americas, such as promoting open discussion of significant
problems confronting government; ensuring proper oversight of government
functions by strengthening internal mechanisms; asking governments of the
world to adopt and enforce measures against bribery in all financial or
commercial transactions with the states of the hemisphere and to invite the OAS
to establish liaison with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development: and developing within the OAS a hemispheric approach to acts of
corruption in both the public and private sectors that would include extradition
and prosecution of individuals so charged, either through negotiation of a new
hemispheric agreement or through new arrangements within existing frameworks

for international cooperation. Id. at 1892-94; see Summit of the Americas. supra
note 242, at 818-19.

245.

Summit of the Americas, supra note 242, at 819. The Summit of the

Americas stated its purpose:

Recognizing the pernicious effects of organized crime and illegal narcotics
on our economies, ethical values, public health, and the social fabric, we
will join the battle against the consumption, production, trafficking and
distribution of illegal drugs, as well as against money laundering and the

illicit trafficking in arms and chemical precursors. We will also cooperate
to create viable alternative development strategies in those countries in
which illicit crops are grown. Cooperation should be extended to
international and national programs aimed at curbing the production, use
and trafficking of illicit drugs and the rehabilitation of addicts.
Id. at 811.
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strategy includes new enforcement methods to disrupt drug
trafficking and money laundering networks and to prosecute
2 46
participants in those activities.

The governments agreed to ratify the 1988 U.N. Convention
Against the Illicit Traffic of Narcotics and Psychotropic
Substances, thereby agreeing to international standards of drug
control and enforcement. With respect to illicit drug production
and trafficking, the governments also agreed to identify the
region's narcotics trafficking and money laundering networks,
prosecute their leaders, and seize assets derived from these
activities. They decided to adopt programs to prevent and reduce
the demand for illicit drugs, as well as to develop effective and
environmentally sound national strategies to prevent or
substantially reduce the cultivation and processing of crops for
the illegal drug trade. The governments focused on national and
international support for development programs that create viable
alternatives to drug production. They agreed to control precursor
chemicals and support comprehensive drug interdiction
strategies. They also agreed to strengthen efforts to control
firearms, ammunition, and explosives to avoid their diversion to
drug traffickers and criminal organizations.
Finally, the
governments pledged to hold a hemisphere-wide conference of
donors, including multilateral development banks and U.N.
agencies, to seek resources for alternative development programs
aimed at curbing the production, trafficking, and use of illicit
drugs, as well as the rehabilitation of addicts. 247
While the Summit's Plan of Action developed a regional
strategy for combating illicit drug trafficking, the governments
themselves still bear the responsibility for implementing the
Plan. 24 8

The OAS maintains a supportive role in protecting

human rights, working against corruption, and eliminating the
threat of national and international terrorism. The CICAD has an
active role in combating drug trafficking, and the International
Development Bank has a significant partnership role in promoting
and protecting human rights and fighting corruption and drug
trafficking. 249 The Plan of Action, however, does not bind the
governments and presents no real obligations. The lack of
binding duties on the various governments reflects disagreement

246.

Zagaris, supra note 243, at 1894.

247. Summit of the Americas, supra note 242, at 820; see Zagarls, supra
note 243, at 1895. The Summit of the Americas also addressed the issues of
terrorism, human rights, and environmental protection. See generally Summit of
the Americas, supra.
248. Zagaris, supranote 243, at 1898.
249.
Id.
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over some of the goals and compromises needed to enforce the
0
law.25
Although it lacks enforcement provisions, the Summit of the
Americas represents a sound regional effort to address the illicit
drug trafficking issue and focuses attention on the heart of the
problem: criminal drug trafficking. By stating aims to curtail the
money laundering and human rights abuses associated with the
drug trade, the Summit focuses attention on the most detrimental
aspects of the illicit drug industry. Organized crime and drug
addiction represent much larger problems to national and
international security than coca production in Bolivia. Coca has,
after all, been produced and chewed for centuries. Why should
Bolivia now pay such a high price for a foreign demand of its only
profitable crop? While many believe the drug problem should be
attacked at the root of production, equal numbers believe it
should be attacked at the apex of consumption. This age-old
debate is fruitless, because both supply and demand contribute to
the massive scope of the international drug problem.
By
addressing both aspects of the problem, the multilateral
initiatives of the Summit of the Americas offer an effective and
comprehensive approach to attacking this debilitating regional

problem.
V. PROPOSALS FOR FuruRE LEGIsLATIvE ACTION

As Bolivia and other coca-producing countries respond to
international pressure, their own national and regional drug
legislation must continue to be a priority.
The current
effectiveness of such laws and law enforcement raises serious
doubts, making new approaches to the coca issue necessary.
A. Bolivian Legislation: An Exercise in Futility?

If Bolivia wishes to control the cultivation of coca leaves used
for cocaine and rid itself of criminal narco-trafficking
organizations, the central government will have to improve its
enforcement tools. Bolivia cannot continue to allow criminal drug
organizations to infiltrate its political and economic systems

250. Id. Zagaris notes that the Plan of Action's lack of real obligations by
the governments also "reflects the immature status of hemispheric mechanisms
and institutions on enforcement." Id. Zagaris recommends the creation of an
Americas Committee on Crime Problems under the auspices of the OAS, to
discuss and take action on questions of common criminal justice needs, with

membership being open to all countries in the Western Hemisphere, and which
could emulate the European Committee on Crime Problems. Id. at 1898-99.
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without formally addressing their presence. Although Bolivia
verbalizes support for the international fight against cocaine
trafficking, its domestic policies do not yet reflect a serious
national commitment to stopping coca cultivation. 25 ' Bolivia has
not tried to hide its dependence on foreign aid and has even
conditioned its cooperation in the fight against drugs on
international financial assistance. 2 52 In attempting to balance a
strong cultural tradition of coca-use with the modern threat of
cocaine trafficking, Bolivia appears perplexed. Although Bolivians
understand the tensions, they question the best approach to take.
Ley 1008 represents an effort by Bolivia to comply with U.S.
and international demands concerning coca. Although Ley 1008
asserts the important traditional uses of the coca leaf and focuses
on legal uses before describing illegal uses of coca, the legislation
does not satisfy the general Bolivian population. Ley 1008 has
international appeal, but does not give due attention to the
underlying economic conditions perpetuating the coca industry.
In stating the need for crop substitution and alternative

development, Ley 1008 follows U.S. policy by suggesting that
crops besides coca will be able to satisfy farmers' financial
needs. 25 3 Bolivia's rural poverty, however, will not be solved in
the short term through alternative development and economic
reactivation; nor will its coca cultivation diminish through such
short-term measures. 25 4 Ley 1008 is thus unsuccessful in its
anti-drug enforcement efforts.
Bolivia's legislation should reflect long-term movement away
from supplying coca to the cocaine industry. 25 5 Eradication

251. Bolivia has essentially refused to impose eradication on well-organized
and politically powerful coca growers. The government briefly attempted an
eradication in February 1994, but was met with violent opposition. Falco,
PassingGrades, supranote 2, at 18-19.
252. Bolivia depends heavily on foreign aid to keep its legal economy afloat.
Bolivia: Americas Review 1997, Am. Rev. World Info., Aug. 1, 1996, at 10,
availabe in 1996 WL 9628122 [hereinafter Americas Review]. According to
Bolivia's Central Bank, Bolivia's foreign debt will reach $4.65 billion in 1996. with
foreign debt payments approaching $379 million. Economic growth, which has
not varied greatly in the last decade, Is expected to continue at four percent. Id.
253. Evo Morales, a popular cocalero organizer, said: "As long as there are
no alternatives [coca growers] can make a living from, they will continue
producing coca." Long, supranote 98.

254. The growth rate for Bolivia's legal agricultural industry was estimated
to be a meager 1.7% in 1995, suffering in recent years from drought. Americas
Review, supranote 252. Although the Bolivian economy has recovered during the
1990s, most analysts link this success to Bolivia's tremendous income from coca.
K1epak, supranote 8.

255. Coca itself is obviously not the problem, but Its profitability today is
dominated by the cocaine industry. President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada
focused Bolivia's problem with the connection between coca and cocaine: "'Our
big problem'... 'is that the Bolivian people are against narco-trafficking, but they
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should not be the central focus of any legislation, national or
international.
Imprisonment
of
cocaleros
is
also
counterproductive, leading to possible human rights violations as
well as increasing the number of farmers needed to produce a
certain amount of cocaine.
Paying farmers for voluntary
eradication of coca crops also may cause increased production, as
farmers produce to be paid for eradicating; additionally,

government payment for eradication will unlikely meet the prices
256

for illicit sales.
Bolivia's present goals should be self-made and should reflect

the involvement of the many parties involved in the coca and
cocaine industry. Bolivia should focus on assessing the gravity of
the problem. Accurate estimates are needed for current levels of
production; types of organizations involved in producing legal and
illegal coca; money generated by the illicit trade that re-enters the
Bolivian economy; foreign involvement in present anti-drug
projects; and overall domestic attitudes toward reducing coca
cultivation. Without assessing these factors, Bolivia's anti-drug
legislation will continue to look like a foreign-imposed law and will
likely remain largely unenforced.
Bolivia needs a national
consensus to address its coca problem. It must include the
cocalero unions, various peasant organizations, higher-level drug
organizations, and the general public. Each of these groups
represents too large a faction in Bolivian politics to be silenced
through the legislative process.
B. Inter-AmericanLegislation: A Call to Cooperate
The cocaine trade cannot be controlled by any one country,
however, as the U.S. policy over the last twenty years has
demonstrated.
Thus, international involvement is absolutely
necessary.
The 1988 U.N. Convention creates international
norms for the control of illicit drugs.
Many key countries,
including Bolivia, have adopted these norms by ratifying the
Convention. Aside from creating international norms and goals
for curbing drug trafficking, however, the U.N. is a poor vehicle
for enforcement of international law. No single enforcement policy
can effectively curb illicit drug trafficking in each country.

Instead, the majority of multilateral efforts to curb the illicit drug

trade should take place on a regional level.
are for these [coca] farmers'." Falco, PassingGrades, supranote 2. at 19 (quoting
President Lozada).
256.

Perhaps the only successful example of a large:scale reduction In illicit

drug cultivation in recent years is Thailand, where fast economic growth created
opportunities more profitable than opium farming. Falco, U.S. Drug Policy, supra
note 3, at 126.
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In the case of cocaine, the Andean nations should enact, and
subsequently enforce, strong laws to address the transnational

issue of drug trafficking. The OAS has already created one
enforcement vehicle, the CICAD, but its mission is broad and
deals with the cocaine issue on the hemispheric level, including
all of Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States.
Regional interests must coalesce into an attack on the drug
issue. In the Doctrine of Cartagena, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and
the United States stated a goal of cooperation and unity in
attacking criminal drug trafficking. Competing interests do not
allow the Andean states to negotiate on equal footing with the
United States, however. The countries are not unified in their
stance against cocaine production and distribution. Bolivia and
the other Andean nations are threatened by political and
economic instability and frustrated by alleged corruption
throughout the military and political ranks, a result of criminal
organizations' involvement in the cocaine traffic. The United
States, on the other hand, is threatened by violent crime caused
by the drug trade and a large addicted population. For the last
twenty years, these differences have not been reconciled and have
led to a decreased understanding between the nations and an
increase in U.S. pressure for a foreign solution.
Therefore, the United States should reduce its visible
enforcement role in the Latin American drug producing nations
and maintain a more supportive role. The United States should
continue to provide funding, technical assistance, research, and
recommendations to international loan organizations, such as the
World Bank and the International Development Bank. The
burden of solving the current cocaine trafficking problem should
rest on the shoulders of those countries whose economic,
political, and social viability is most affected: Bolivia, Peru, and
Colombia. These countries will only make efforts to solve the
perceived cocaine problem, however, if they consider it in their
self-interest. These nations should increase regional efforts to
address both their collective and individual interests. Regional
efforts should include increasing long-term national and regional
economic growth, combating corruption resulting from the drug
trade, and sharing more information and resources. 25 7 Although

obstacles exist to any regional proposal, regional unity and action

257. Colombia's Vice Minister for Justice proposed that Latin American
countries agree on their own criteria before discussing counter-narcotics

cooperation with the United States: "It's necessary that before starting talks with
Washington, Latin America agrees on a unified criteria for the battle against the
narcotics trade." Colombia Seeks Unified Latin Stance Against Drugs, Reuters N.
Am. Wire, Oct. 15, 1996, avaiaable in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File.

19971

BOLIVIA AND COCA

against criminal drug trafficking are essential to reaching a
solution that will address issues of regional import.

VI. CONCLUSION

An array of international, regional, and domestic laws
currently attempt to control the illicit trafficking of cocaine. Much
of this legislation focuses on the source countries of Bolivia, Peru,
and Colombia. Bolivia's situation is representative of the other
Andean countries' struggle with the cocaine trade and can be
used as a model for evaluating current legislation in the region.
Bolivia's production of coca must be understood in the context of
centuries of cultural traditions dependent on the coca leaf.
Bolivia's stagnated economic development since the era of
Spanish colonial domination forms the basis of its present
economic dependence on coca and cocaine production. Most
recently, Bolivia's enactment of Ley 1008 and ratification of
international and U.S. treaties represent the government's
acceptance of the international drug control strategy.
Domestically, however, the Bolivian government faces a wall of
multi-level opposition to international and national drug control
efforts.
Bolivia's situation appears truly impossible. Caught between
internal and multinational pressures and demands, the Bolivian
government is currently trying to appease both domestic and
international actors. To obtain the international loans needed for
economic development, the only real solution to illicit drug
production, Bolivia must prove its commitment to stopping illicit
coca production. To appease coca growers protesting increased
repression and eradication of their coca crops, Bolivia must
provide alternative development opportunities that are impractical
without international financial assistance. Domestic support in
Bolivia favors the cocaleros and opposes international, especially
U.S., intervention. 25 8 Cocaine, after all, is not Bolivia's problem
criminal organizations trafficking cocaine are every country's
problem.
The solution to cocaine trafficking is unworkable in the
current unilateral and bilateral framework the United States has
created.2 5 9
It is unworkable in the context of hinging

258.
Falco, PassingGrades,supra note 2. at 19.
259.
Emphasizing that both suppliers and consumers are responsible for
the International drug crisis, Mexican Attorney General Enrique Alvarez del
Castillo criticized U.S. anti-drug policy in Latin America: "[Unilateral measures,

positions that slander and intimidate, threats that offend the sovereignty of
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international economic aid for development on Bolivia's
cooperation in the war against drugs.
Furthermore, it Is
unworkable in attempting to increase domestic repression in

Bolivia against small coca farmers and cocaine producers. These
measures have not only proved unsuccessful over the last twenty
years, but also continue to engender hostility among the Bolivian
population.
Instead, legislation should follow the lead set by the Andean
Summit and the Summit of the Americas, with multilateral
initiatives implemented on a regional and national level. The
Andean countries must participate actively and forcefully in an
unprecedented manner, however. The United States should allow
these countries room to negotiate freely without economic
pressures contingent on eradication goals. Until the region and
the specific coca producing nations themselves determine what
their involvement should be, the "war on drugs" will continue to
be a U.S.-imposed "war" with a half-hearted regional support
framework. Bolivia is in a difficult situation complicated by
economic incentives and political demands. Until it is able to
negotiate freely, however, and to address the many conflicting
elements of its current situation, Bolivia will remain dependent on
coca and subject to international demands.
Melanie R. Hallums

peoples and the dignity of individuals, must not be tolerated." Paul Lewis, Drugs
PitBaker vs. Third World at U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1990, at A3.
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